

II.

Milosevic's Voters.

Explaining Grassroots Nationalism in Postcommunist Europe

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

An Analytical Framework to Study Contemporary Nationalism

This chapter deals with the grassroots of ethnic conflict in postcommunist Europe, with a special focus on the Balkans. In other words, it is concerned with Milosevic's voters (and others like them) rather than with the historical circumstances that have the potential to generate ethnic conflict, political environments that allow nationalist leaders to win votes, and institutions that favor certain outcomes in specific conflict circumstances. Declaring the voters a primary interest is not to avow some preference for the hypothesis that mass attitudes or mass behaviors are the main causes of the Balkan ethnic conflict, or of any other ethnic conflict for that matter. While the theory of ethnic conflict remains divided over almost every important issue in two camps that are difficult to reconcile (Horowitz, 1998; chapter one of this book), ethnic favoritism and discrimination against out-groups figure largely in both, although in different explanatory frameworks. Therefore, one can hardly deny the legitimacy of the grassroots approach for Eastern Europe's nationalism. From the general condemnation of the region by Gellner or Kohn as a mere collection of Ruritania, to Robert Kaplan's "Balkan ghosts" or 'George F. Kennan's ancient tribal hatreds, nationalism has been largely

blamed on the masses in Eastern Europe. Some grounds for this are obvious: in the fall of 2002 alone, when the Balkans seemed extremely peaceful compared to previous years, ethnic-based or nationalist parties won elections in Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, of course, Kosovo, where only such parties exist. Ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj made a good score in the Serbian elections. In their time, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman were elected repeatedly by their citizens. Nationalism varies greatly across the region, however. Not every postcommunist country has nationalist leaders who run in elections and make headlines in the domestic and international media; neither are all East Europeans nationalistic, even when nationalists are successful in elections. In some countries, nationalism becomes the dominant ideology, whereas in others it remains only secondary. This variation also justifies a grassroots comparative approach.

What causes support for nationalism in postcommunist societies? Explaining widespread nationalistic attitudes is the main goal of this chapter. Nationalism is defined as *the individual subscription to the political ideology advocating the perfect congruity of the political unit with the national (ethnic) unit*. This definition places the phenomenon at the individual level, while retaining the main elements of the common definitions of nationalism, as belief-system or ideology (Barry, 1987), which is centered on an ethnic identity, based on race, language, culture, and history (Smith, 1991), an internalized ideology shaped by the social representation of a common historical experience. Ethnic identity is defined here, simply, as an individual's ethnic self-ascription (Breakwell, 1982; Giles, 1982). This definition serves our present purpose since we can fairly predict it for most individuals, as well as rely on their ethnic identification, as declared in the surveys discussed in this chapter. Ethnocentrism is defined by the drive to view one's own ethnic group under a favorable light and to disfavor other groups.

This chapter is divided as follows: in the first section, I will clarify my approach and sketch a general theoretical model for the empirical study of nationalism. In the second, I will present my panel of countries, explain why I chose those countries, and provide some background for understanding their particular contexts. In the third section, I will present the surveys used and discuss the main results. In the fourth, the main theoretical hypotheses will be put forth. The fifth section will discuss the results for the main group of countries--Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. The sixth section will be dedicated to Kosovo, and the seventh will summarize the main findings and sketch a model of postcommunist nationalism.

Nationalism is seldom studied at the individual level, although efforts were made, notably by Horowitz, in his masterful *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985) to make a bridge between social psychology and political science. Generalizations from an individual to a group, and from a small group to society, are the source of many errors and biases in ethnic-conflict theory. Among other things, these generalizations generated the paradox of contact theory (Forbes, 1997). As phrased initially by Allport (1954), contact theory claims that contact reduces prejudice among groups. Yet decades of amassed evidence illustrates that individuals who enjoy more contact with another ethnic group tend to be less prejudiced, but that groups with more contact tend to engage in conflict more often. Generalizing from Allport's theory for individuals to larger groups proved catastrophic, as many other variables that are irrelevant for individuals do indeed matter for group behavior. Groups are more than the sums of individuals, and societies are not just the sum of the various social groups within them.


But this does not mean that inferences from the individual level are not valuable to understanding what happens at the societal level. It only means they are insufficient. Clearly, one cannot understand what happens at the society level without a comprehension of the


dynamics at the individual level. It is crucial to understand why Serbian voters elected Milosevic repeated times, even after most of the world had denounced him as a new Hitler. The model in figure 1 attempts to capture the relationship between the two levels of analysis--societal and individual--as well as horizontal causal relationships, which public opinion models try to capture. The societal level forms the upper level of the figure (which is a mirror) and consists of the formal institutions, which are borders, power-sharing arrangements, state structure (federal or unitary), the ethnic group's status (as state holder or state seeker). It includes the informal institutions, consisting of practices and informal arrangements with other groups (for example, cooperation, competition, or violence). These usually reflect both current and previous formal institutions. If a group historically has enjoyed an inferior position, and its status is equalized with the dominant group at some point, informal institutions or practices need a period of time to catch up with the legal developments. Finally, we have the public opinion on the ethnic matter, which is an aggregate of majority opinions on the status of other groups or nations and relations with them. All these layers then have their correspondents at the individual level. An individual has his or her own attitudes toward one's nation, borders, and neighbors; his or her own status as member of a dominant, inferior, unique, or equal national constituent group; and a personal social position, which renders this status more or less acceptable. An individual also behaves in a certain way toward the national question. He or she may vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen, plant bombs to liberate the Basque country, or simply ignore the matter.

Correspondences between the two levels are obvious. If many individuals espouse prejudice, a majority will support a law restricting immigration. If a large group of people vote for a nationalistic leader, the leader will be elected. If too many members of the minority decide to mingle in the larger society to acquire a superior social status, a minority group can be assimilated and disappear. Furthermore, all the formal institutions and most informal

institutions are historical products. Unlike public opinion, which can shift after a dramatic event in almost no time (like a majority supporting a foreign war after the bombing of the World Trade Center), institutions are more durable and produce long-lasting effects. As Douglas North wrote in the aftermath of the fall of communism, “today’s and tomorrow choices are shaped by the past” (North, 1990: vii). In addition to historical data, information on formal and informal arrangements, as well as on individual’s opinions on them, is available allow inferences that are clearly placed at the individual level. The theory *directly* relevant for this chapter is therefore limited to the one inferring from individual attitudes and behavior, although much of the larger theory from various disciplines on nationalism works with assumptions about human behavior and its consequences. The most important psychological theories that have tried to shed some light on the human propensity toward discriminative behavior that can be extrapolated to nationalism are: Allport’s prejudice/contact theory, the theory of authoritarian personality (Adorno et al.), social-identity theory (Henri Tajfel and the Bristol school), and social-dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto). Although largely discarded today, the theory of real interests conflict can still be traced at the roots of many policies (Becker, 1957; Sheriff, 1967; Sowell, 1981). Horowitz draws on social-identity theory, descending from the society level to seek an explanation at the individual or small-group level. I will journey in exactly the opposite direction.

Figure 1: A tripartite model for the study of nationalism





The Region: The Balkans and Beyond

The chapter surveys a region broader than the Balkans, also including Hungary and its Central European neighbors. Thus, the panel includes Serbia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. To a large extent, the countries in the area share a long history of foreign occupation, late state formation in their present makeup and a communist regime for the second half of the twentieth century. Diplomats and scholars have argued repeatedly on the substantiation of including these countries in either Central or Eastern Europe. Equally disputed is the composition of the ill-famed Balkans to which no state, except Bulgaria, fully acknowledges belonging. Hungary and Slovakia, the latter a new state, are clearly Central European by geography. Excepting Hungary, a special case, none of these five countries is ethnically homogenous. Their share of minorities varies, but, on the average, it is considerably higher than in Western Europe. Of course, a country can have nationalism without minorities and border problems, as it seems one can have anti-Semitism without Jews. And, indeed, in many Western European developed countries, immigration plays the same role as the presence of indigenous minorities in Eastern Europe, prompting national self-awareness and xenophobia. The agenda in the West, however, is utterly different, as are the stakes. Borders and sovereignty issues, crucial in Eastern Europe, are seldom a topic in the West, except for very special cases (the Basque country or Northern Ireland, for example). The issues of ethnic minorities, borders, and sovereignty are closely interlinked in Eastern Europe. Centuries of foreign occupation have frozen, to a large extent, the organic development of social communication on the basis of one language (Deutsch, 1953). The consequence of this evolution, in Brubaker's words, is a "triadic nexus," involving national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands, which all contribute to the escalation of

national awareness (Brubaker, 1996: 6). Each and every state of the region declares that it is responsible for its kin living in the near abroad. Politically organized Hungarian minorities are found in Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania. Macedonian Slavs in Macedonia, a successor state of Yugoslavia, speak a language close to Bulgarian, as most Moldovans in Moldova, a successor state of the Soviet Union, speak Romanian (which the Moldovan Communist Party calls Moldovan). Borders have shifted repeatedly, and identities have followed suit as well. Not every regional identity is equally old and stable. There are Albanians living in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbs living in what is now the international protectorate of Kosovo, where Albanians form the majority. The intricacies of these patterns of cohabitation are shown in table 1.

Table 1: Majorities and Minorities

	Total	Largest	Minorities
	Population in	Ethnic	
	State or Unit	Group's	
		Share of	
		Population	
		(%)	
Bulgaria	8,200,000	83	Turkish--697,000; Roma--213,200; Other--246,000
Bosnia	3,800,000	44	Serb--1,178,000; Croat--646,000; Other--266,000

Czech Republic	10,300,000	81.2	Moravian--1,369,900; Slovak--309,000; Other--309,000
Hungary	10,000,000	89.9	Roma--400,000, German--260,000; Other--300,000
Kosovo	1,600,000- 1,800,000	88	Serbs 7% (uncertain); Bosnians 2%; Roma 1.68%
Macedonia	2,000,000	66.6	Albanian--454,000; Turkish--80,000; Roma--60,000Other--120,000
Moldova	4,300,000	64.5	Russian--593,400; Ukrainian--559,000; Gagauz--150,500 Other--215,000
Romania	22,400,000	89.5	Hungarian--1,590,400; Other--448,000
Serbia	10,700,000	63	Albanian--1,498,000; Montenegrin--535,000; Hungaria 428,000; Other--1,177,000
Slovakia	5,400,000	85.7	Hungarian--572,400; Other--162,000
Slovenia	2,000,000	88	Croatian--60,000; Other--120,000

My choice of countries has a twofold explanation. First, as I am looking at the interplay between communism and nationalism, the populations must have had experience of both in sufficient degree. All of the countries selected share both considerable common experience and considerable variation of national diversity and the problems it underwrites. Romania and Bulgaria have large ethnic minorities, but they are unitary states. Romania borders the Balkans, but it is sometimes considered Eastern Balkan, sometimes Central European. State building has been more intense in Slovakia, a fully independent state only from 1991, as well as in Kosovo which, although formally still part of Serbia, is learning self-government under the tutorship of the international community. In Brubaker's terminology, my panel of countries includes four nationalizing states, a minority (Kosovo) and a homeland state—Hungary.

The nature of communist regimes in these countries also varied substantially. Romania's totalitarian regime and Serbia's authoritarian one were considered as national communist. Unlike the other countries, they were not occupied by the Soviet Army (in the case of Romania, only in the last 30 years of Ceausescu's regime), and their domestic leaders resorted to nationalist and patriotic rhetoric to boost their legitimacy. The retreat of the Soviet Army from the rest of the countries was celebrated as a major symbolic event, clearly tying communism with foreign occupation. Although the situation is complex in every country, resisting simple categorization, some of them did emerge after the first decade of postcommunism as successful in dealing with multiethnicity (Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia), while others were plagued by ethnic war (Serbia and Kosovo). All the countries in the sample have formally expressed their decision to join European Union, with Hungary and Slovakia already in, Romania and Bulgaria negotiating for 2007, and Serbia and Montenegro on the path for an association agreement in 2003.

The reason for limiting the choice to these countries is of a different nature. Surveys on nationalism are not common, and survey capacity in some of these countries is weak because of an absence of reliable demographic data. As a result, sets of national data are either unavailable or difficult to homogenize for the purpose of comparative analysis. This restricted choice of countries (missing the other former Yugoslav republics) is, therefore, driven partly by the necessity to have reliable data for comparison. It is compensated, hopefully, by the fact that this is original data, reported here for the first time, based on similar questionnaires and sampling designs for the purpose of comparative analysis.

Measuring Nationalism

Although widely debated and extensively studied, nationalism in the postcommunist world is still something of a mystery. Some authors argue that it is a positive phenomenon, responsible for the defeat of communist ideology, a response to a need for an identity related to freedom (Nodia, 1997). Other scholars claim that it is a ideology leading to totalitarianism, which has in bed with communism more than once, and is fundamentally directed against individual freedom and democracy (Michnik, 1991; Brubaker, 1996). In the first instance, nationalizing policies are benign and necessary for nation building (Taras, 2001). In the second, they are malign and threaten the peace of ethnically mixed regions. Surveys measuring the appeal of nationalism in postcommunist countries (Times Mirror, 1991; Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998; Colton, 1999; Gordy, 1999) revealed its attractiveness, with, as the Times Mirror survey put it, Eastern Europeans disliking both their borders and their neighbors (Times Mirror, 1991: 202). Due to historical circumstances, the successor states of Yugoslavia were missed by these surveys. But these past studies remain important because they bring considerable evidence that grassroots nationalism, far from being confined to the Balkans, is widespread throughout the postcommunist world.

The surveys used in this chapter were sponsored by Freedom House in Bulgaria (2000), Slovakia (2000), and Serbia (2002), and by UNDP in Romania (2001) and Kosovo (2002) and executed by national pollsters. The data on Hungary comes from a survey, conducted in 1993, for the Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe Project and is courtesy of the UK Data Archive. Details on the surveys are outlined in appendix 1 of this chapter.

The method employed here is not so common in comparative politics. In a world increasingly dominated by regions rather than spheres, in-depth regional understanding probably lies in an intermediate approach somewhere between an exhaustive country specific knowledge and broader testing of particular hypotheses (Katzenstein, 1996: 14). So rather

than simply observing what varies between the countries, I cast a thorough look within each of them, building separate national models of nationalism, and comparing determinants of nationalism across the region. With this, we can preserve in the models the specificity of each environment, which is so important in explaining nationalism and ethnic conflict. This comparison is based, therefore, on the study of each population-- Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbians, Slovaks, Hungarians, and Kosovars. Minorities were included in the original samples (with the exception of Kosovo and Serbia, where separate samples were drawn) creating a dummy variable to account for one's position as member of the majority group.

Nationalism was operationalized in these surveys by a common battery of a minimum of four variables (six in the lengthier questionnaires in Serbia and Romania). The congruence sought between the ethnic unit and the political unit usually manifests itself through *territorial nationalism* (the idea that state borders and the borders of the cultural nation should be one and the same) and *cultural nationalism* (the idea that within borders political rights should be granted only to speakers of the language of the dominant ethnic group). My first question was a common one, asking respondents if they felt that territories of neighboring countries do in fact belong to their own country. The second phenomenon, cultural nationalism, was measured by agreement with the statement that only people who speak the official or national language are entitled to vote. To explore the issue further, I added two more variables. One, adjusted from the classic authoritarian personality questionnaire, asked respondents if they perceived minorities as a threat to their country's sovereignty and borders. Finally, the fourth question measured attitudes toward the West by querying respondents on their willingness to concede that international organizations can tell their nation how to run its affairs. This is relevant since, during the Cold War, the West was the identified enemy and now also imposes, more or less, the rules of the transition in every country, making democracy and a free market the norm. The question is even more necessary in view of the loss of sovereignty

implicit in the European integration process. This battery of questions addressed therefore all the features of postcommunist nationalism signaled in literature, its anti-Western, antineighbors and antiminority components. As the four variables turned out to be strongly correlated, I then created a nationalism factor out of them, extracting principal components. This factor was then used as a dependent variable for multivariate linear regression models explaining nationalism (see table 4). For Romania and Serbia, I submitted another group of variables to the same treatment, measuring authoritarian or autocratic attitudes to create a factor of authoritarianism. For the rest of the countries, a proxy for authoritarianism was used. The components of these factors are broken down in appendix 2, while results are displayed below in table 2.

Table 2: Nationalism as a Broad Regional Phenomenon

Agreement with the following statements:	Romania	Bulgaria	Kosovo	Serbia	Slovakia	Hungary
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Parts of other countries belong to us (territorial nationalism)	67	45	81	50	na*	60
Those who cannot speak the state's language should not have the right to vote (cultural nationalism)	50	26	na	45	58	61
Foreigners should not be able to tell us how to run our own country (In Hungary, there is a danger of becoming a colony of the West.)	64	72	72	74	76	40
Minorities are a threat to sovereignty	44	43	78	75	72	na

and borders						
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Source: Polls conducted in Serbia in 2002; Bulgaria, 2000; Slovakia, 2000 (SAR-Freedom House data); Romania, 2001; Kosovo, 2002 (UNDP data); Hungary, 1993 (MODUS data).
*not available

Results point to strong territorial nationalism in the entire region, with the least amount of people answering affirmatively in Bulgaria and the most in Kosovo. Serbia falls behind Romania and Hungary, with only half of the population considering that Serbia has territories within other states. Cultural nationalism is, again, the lowest in Bulgaria, with respondents evenly divided in the rest of the countries. Hungary's high score is probably explained by the absence of sizeable minorities speaking alternative languages (Miller et al., 1998), but it completes the regional view that citizens should speak the official language. What state language means is not clear in every situation, so pollsters received detailed instructions on a country-by-country basis on how to phrase this question. Bulgaria and Hungary have only one national state language; in Slovakia, Hungarian has the status of a second official language, and, despite fierce legal battles during the Meciar era, the language has retained this status during most of the transition. In Romania, the Constitution gives official status to Romanian only, while specifying that other languages can be used in the judicial and administrative systems in areas where minorities live. More recent legislation has made Hungarian a de facto second official language in the counties with large numbers of Hungarians. Imperfect language pluralism in the former Yugoslavia ended when the country split into the component republics, with different solutions in each republic, and the Albanian language retaining the least recognized status.

Increasing minorities' rights or concessions over sovereignty seem, therefore, not too popular with segments of the public. Bulgaria's macroeconomic policy may be run by a foreign currency board, but its public is strongly opposed to the idea that foreign organizations, such as the EU or IMF, should have a role in the country's political scene. The

same feelings are shared by Kosovars who are de facto governed by the international community through UNMIK, and by citizens of Slovakia, Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Romania, all of whom have been granted membership in the EU or are potential members. Minorities are perceived as a threat everywhere, especially in Serbia and Kosovo, but also in Slovakia, and, to a less extent, in Romania and Bulgaria. Awareness of the issue is high, with a long conflict history. After liberal treatment of the minorities in the first decades of their regimes, by the 1980s, both Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania and Todor Jivkov in Bulgaria had imbued their national communist regimes with a clear antiminority stand. Attempts to assimilate Turks in Bulgaria and Hungarians in Romania through a range of denationalization policies during the last decade of the communist era attracted, for the first time, the attention of the international community, signaling that these countries had become a serious danger to segments of their own citizenry. In 2001, Viktor Orbán's right-wing government in Hungary promoted the Status Law that granted a Hungarian identification card to all ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, allowing them to travel to Hungary without a visa and entitling them to welfare benefits in their so-called homeland. The policy was disputed by Romania and Slovakia and made headlines for more than a year.

Table 3: Trust in Other Ethnic Groups in Serbia and Romania

Serbs trust . . .	Mean (std. deviation)	Romanians trust . . .	Mean (std. deviation)
Serbs	7.76 (2.37)	Romanians	7.48 (2.31)
Bosnian Serbs	6.66 (2.72)	Transylvanians (Romania)	7.70 (2.44)
Macedonian Slavs	5.90 (2.49)	Moldovans	6.70 (2.78)

		(Romania)	
Hungarians	4.53 (2.53)	Germans	5.70 (3.07)
Romanians	4.24 (2.41)	Moldovans (Moldova)	5.08 (3.05)
Austrians	4.80 (2.63)	Jews	4.61 (3.11)
Germans	4.40 (2.82)	Serbs	4.65 (3.06)
Americans	3.63 (2.82)	Bulgarians	4.38 (2.97)
Roma	3.42 (2.19)	Hungarians (Romania)	4.28 (2.88)
Bosnian Muslims	3.38 (2.48)	Roma	4.26 (3.12)
Kosovar Albanians	2.35 (2.27)	Russians	4.25 (2.97)

Legend: Scale from 1 to 10, with 10 as maximum trust.

Even deeper than these political attitudes toward nationalism, measurements of ethnocentrism (using a scale of trust from one to ten in one's ethnic group as well as the other neighboring groups) show the expected in-group favoritism, albeit with some nuances. Romanians view various minorities differently, as well as their conationals, ranking Transylvanians higher than Moldovans, while distrusting Moldovans across the border in the former Soviet state of Moldova, but less so than Hungarians or Roma. In Serbia, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians are at the bottom of public trust, both falling below the Roma. But Westerners are also distrusted in Serbia. The war waged against Milosevic by the rest of the world may be responsible for that, as many Serbs perceived it as a war against all Serbs. The distance between the most trusted and the least trusted is higher in Serbia than

Romania, as well as the distance between one's own ethnic group and the next most trusted group. The conclusions seems to be that Romanians are less ethnocentric than Serbs.

Hypothesizing Nationalism

Mancur Olson once remarked that “human beings rarely act out of unmixed motives,” (Olson, 2000: 3). Finding one clear-cut explanation justifying the endorsement of nationalism by large numbers of East Europeans might be, in this case, just a delusion. There are many competing explanations. Is it that old ethnic resentment is strong enough to resurface, despite fifty years of forced homogenization and repression of ostentatious nationalism during the communist regimes? Or is it the fear that minorities will secede, breaking away with national territories? Or are we dealing with plain authoritarianism, a legacy of communist socialization, requiring a strict enforcement of conformity on minorities? Is it the appeal of charismatic nationalist leaders?

The first step in answering the above questions is to group the large number of causes of mass nationalism advanced by various scholars in a few more structured categories. Let me start with the first and most popular--the ethnic-hatreds theory, which purports that so-called ethnic tribes distrust and hate those who do not belong to their same blood community. This is what George Kennan described as the “tendency to view the outsider, generally, with dark suspicion and to see the political-military opponent, in particular, as a fearful and implacable enemy to be rendered harmless only by total and un pitying destruction” (Kennan, 1996: 201). This theory has become a default explanation, as well as the most popular one, for everything that has occurred in the Balkans since 1989. It assumes that the causes of nationalism are psychological givens. *People are inclined to trust only those of the same kin and to distrust*

foreigners. This structural predisposition toward the distrust of foreigners is all the more natural in rural and underdeveloped societies. In this case, nationalism should be associated with social contexts of poverty and underdevelopment, as well as with distrust of foreigners and minorities.

According to social-identity theory, negative perceptions of others as inferior to one's own serve the purpose of boosting a group's positive social identity (Tajfel, 1981; Brewer, 1987). Tajfel attributed the intensity of feelings over these matters to the challenge to one's self-esteem. Self-esteem comes to be associated with national identity through a variety of socializing experiences. Self-esteem was also important in the contact theory, elaborated by Allport, which assumed that individuals who enjoyed less contact with other ethnic groups should be more discriminative. Discriminative behavior is also implicit in the social-dominance theory, which postulates that every multiethnic society tends to produce a hierarchical assignment of groups with the one on top, closer to the nation (Sidanius and Pratto, 1998). In accordance, nation comes to be associated with the dominant group (the majority or the ruling elite). Therefore, it follows that this specific group would espouse more nationalism or patriotism.

Even though there are important differences among these theories, they tend to cluster around one hypothesis postulating that nationalism is only a form of in-group favoritism. The classic authoritarian personality theory, on the other hand, dealt more with individuals than groups. For convenience, its argument can be separated in two parts. The first asserts that discriminative behavior is part of a syndrome which also includes rigidity, paranoia, conspiratorial thinking, and low self-esteem, all conclusions which emerged from applying the authoritarianism questionnaire. The other speculates that the causes for this syndrome lie in an individual's personality, a product of very early socialization, and therefore impossible to change. The personality aspect is not testable in a research design such as mine and has

been the object of disputes ever since it was first published. The syndrome aspect, namely, the empirical finding that these psychological features tend to be found together rather than separately, is of great interest for research on nationalism in Eastern Europe.

To test these hypotheses, each survey had at least one statement measuring trust toward one's kin versus trust toward foreigners. Statements included: "Only your kin can be trusted," "Only your ethnic group can be trusted," and "Most people can be trusted," as well as questions on household welfare and regional development. The longer Romanian and Serbian questionnaires included a scale of trust in other ethnic groups (from one to ten), and, in Kosovo, a measurement of social distance as perceived by Kosovars toward every neighboring group was included. These were used as ethnocentrism scales.

The next category of explanations emerges from regional and postcommunist studies. The reappearance of nationalism on the ruins of communism led several analysts to allege a causal link between them. As synthesized in the phrase of Adam Michnik, "Nationalism is the last word of Communism. A final attempt to find a social basis for dictatorship. Kim II Sung, Castro, but also Milosevic, the leaders of Serbia's communists, are good illustrations of that" (Michnik, 1991: 565). This political hypothesis sees nationalism not as a remote inheritance of historical conflicts and structural distrust, but as a purely residual phenomenon, essentially communist determined, a form of authoritarianism that emerged because of communist socialization. The source of this idea can be found, unexpectedly, even in historical theory, for instance in the Greenfeld argument (1992), which alleges that far from being cosmopolitan, communism was founded on the old dichotomy between East and West, and contributed to forging a national Russian identity in opposition to the West. So one explanation is that communism might have laid the grounds for nationalism through its anti-Western socialization. The second places the blame on communist ideology, a worldview that explained everything, and whose failure left, in Michnik's words, an "ideological vacuum."

Combined with the challenge the transition poses to identity, this vacuum generates the insecurity that leads large masses to adopt nationalist and populist ideologies. This implies that people ultimately found some use for communist ideology, as a provider of identity and even a stabilizer of mood. If valid, this hypothesis implies that an association exists between communist ideology and nationalism.

An alternative powerful explanation, although more difficult to test in a public opinion research design, regards the role of former communist leaders. Many nationalist leaders, including Milosevic, Tadjman, and Vadim Tudor of Romania, were active in the communist regime either as apparatchiks or propagandists. Yet it is also true that Tadjman, as well as Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, had long fallen from the grace of the Communist Party by 1989. In addition, other nationalist leaders, such as Gheorge Funar in Romania or Hungary's Viktor Orban did not have a connection to the Communist Party. Former communist leaders were accused of having unleashed nationalism to mobilize popular support and ensure their control, even when their communist party was clearly losing popular appeal. To do so, these leaders unscrupulously employed the entire arsenal of communist manipulation to attain their goal of preserving power (Gordy, 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999; Gallagher, 2000, in Pridham and Gallagher). This explanation must somehow combine with another. No matter how manipulative and shrewd a leader, his message must find some echo in the public opinion to get votes. In Slovakia's parliamentary elections in 2002, Meciar garnered the largest number of votes, even when he was in the opposition and no longer in control of the party propaganda apparatus. Funar and Tudor were always in the opposition but received many votes. In Romania, Funar won the race for the mayor of Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, three times, and Tudor managed to enter the second round of the presidential election in 2000 (although he never received more than a third of the vote). Bulgaria is the only country where a strong nationalist leader has not emerged during the last decade, and the postcommunist party

recorded good electoral scores without resorting to nationalism. There seems to be evidence, in other words, that, in many countries, communist leaders and successor communist parties used the former propaganda arsenal to instrument the passage from “enemy of the regime” to “enemy of the nation.” The challenge is how to separate their *personal* appeal from their *ideological* appeal. But surely one should be able, at least, to find a positive correlation between nationalism and the popularity of certain leaders who openly promote intolerant and xenophobic attitudes.

Finally, communism may have laid the grounds for nationalism by creating an authoritarian syndrome of its own. Ordinary life under communism, in addition to the heavy repression of dissent and blame on the West for economic hardship, produced shortages of essential goods. This made people compete for everything, from food to toilet paper. As a result, even neighbors and friends were perceived as either competitors or informants of the secret service, making paranoid attitudes thrive. Similarly, the total inability to shape one’s life, fully regulated by the communist state, is likely to have left scars, such as fatalistic and passive political attitudes. Socialization in this environment meant promotion of social envy and distrust, paranoid and selfish attitudes. By authoritarianism, I understand, therefore, a complex of closely correlated attitudes, a syndrome not so different than the one described by the authors of the authoritarian personality, involving antidemocratic beliefs, passive and fatalistic attitudes about participation in politics, and the propensity to perceive enemies and blame them for the country’s problems. The richer questionnaires used in Romania and Serbia allowed for building more complex factors, but all the questionnaires included at least one identical proxy to test this hypothesis.

In the country-by-country analysis, three other important variables were used to test Michnik’s “blame communism” hypothesis: self-assessed ideology (placement on a left-right scale), appreciation of communism as a good idea poorly implemented, and trust in the

political system (factor score of trust in parliament, government, president, and prime minister). This entire group of variables can account for a generic residual communism hypothesis. If this hypothesis is correct, *nationalism should be associated with antidemocratic and paranoid attitudes, low trust in politics, and a positive evaluation of communism.*

The third group of explanations regards the context. Basic nationalistic attitudes are present at high levels in all these countries, but nationalism mobilizes majorities and leads to violence only in some countries. It is likely that the triggers and stakes, which vary in the specific environment, account for the different outcomes, even if attitudes are rather uniform. People are mobilized when the stakes increase, for example when new borders are to be drawn, rights already secured are denied, and so forth. In other words, they are mobilized by the perception of threat. Threat varied greatly among the countries surveyed. Serbia, menaced by separatism from Kosovo and Montenegro, and Kosovo, uncertain of its final status, compare against Hungary and Slovakia, neither of which have threats to their borders or stability, and Bulgaria or Romania, whose minorities are peaceful and do not have a delimited territory they can secede with. All the surveys had open questions on the main problems and challenges faced by the countries in transition. The secession of Kosovo from Serbia, Kosovo's final status, as well as Romanian fears of a war similar to that in the former Yugoslavia, came about spontaneously. Nothing of the sort was invoked in Bulgaria or Slovakia. A follow-up question to measure the intensity of the threat mentioned was then added. This accounts for our threat variable. Also under context, one should test the frustration with transition hypothesis, which has also been popular in literature. Poverty, unemployment, and the serious decline in living standards since the communist era are all thought to enhance ethnic competition and nationalism.

To test these hypotheses, models were designed using the nationalism factor as a dependent variable for every country, including Hungary and Slovakia, where its composition

was slightly different. As a general rule, all scales included elements of territorial nationalism, attitude toward the West, and cultural nationalism. Attitude toward minorities were included everywhere except Hungary, which practically does not have minorities. While final multivariate models emerging from linear regressions are outlined in table 5, the history of each model based on testing predictors separately is of equal importance.

“State” Nationalists . . .

Nationalism depends little on social status. Milosevic’s voters in Serbia were more likely to be poor, but no other social structure variables predict if a Serb will turn nationalistic or not. In the region in general, nationalists are more likely to be recruited among the poor, old, and less educated, with males (in status models only) more nationalistic than women. Nationalists are more likely to come from the ranks of unemployed only in Slovakia, and from villagers in Bulgaria and, to some extent, in Serbia (status model only). But overall, social status items explained little of nationalism. Not only were many findings not robust and disappeared in more complex variants of the models (see table 4), but they also explained little of the variance, even with media consumption added. The effects of the media are visible in the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Kosovar models, and they tend to be positive, despite the difficulty of interpreting them in the absence of some indication of the specific media people watch or read. As a general rule, individuals who read more political reports in newspapers tend to be lower rather than higher on the nationalism scale, but this variable should be seen more as an indicator of individual political sophistication than of the press’s influence. There was also no association between having been a member of the Communist Party and having a nationalistic

attitude. However, as both common sense and social-dominance theory predict, members of the ethnic majority are more likely to have nationalistic views.

Structural psychological factors were also disappointing as predictors. The main common variable tested in all models was interpersonal trust, measured as agreement with the statement “only your kin can be trusted.” In bivariate models, there was an association between believing that only one’s kin is trustworthy and the nationalism scale. When more controls were added, however, this variable lost its significance in all the models, except Romania and Kosovo, where it explained little of variance but was robust enough to feature in the final model. The scale of trust (ethnocentrism) factor turned up as a predictor in the final models for Romania and Serbia, but also explained little (see table 4). Unlike interpersonal trust, a basic variable, the trust factor indicating ethnocentrism, built either from trust in other ethnic groups (Romania and Serbia) or social distance toward others (Kosovo) is in itself a complex indicator, needing separate explanation. Finally, structural factors combined with status controls in the Romanian and Serbian models, the most complex, including interpersonal trust and trust in other ethnic groups, accounted for less than a third of the total variance explained.

The next group made of residual communism elements--authoritarianism, ideology, and trust in politics—accounted, when added to status controls, for almost all the variance and was very significant in each and every country model. People who believe that ideology is irrelevant for their political choice or are ignorant on ideology altogether (Hungary) are likely to score higher on the nationalism scale in every country in the status models. This finding was robust enough to feature in the final models for Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The authoritarian syndrome, formed by paranoid attitudes, endorsement of undemocratic alternatives, and fatalism (“people cannot influence politics”), is present in almost every country and is the most powerful predictor where tested as such. Similarly, low trust in the

political system (factor scores of trust in the executive and legislative branches) predicts nationalism consistently across all countries. In Hungary, where the questionnaire was slightly different, the most consistent predictor among residual attitudes was the feeling that no political party represents the views of the respondent. In Slovakia, where the questionnaire was shorter, the two existing components of authoritarianism were tested separately, and both political fatalism and rejection of democracy turned out to be powerful predictors. It becomes evident that nationalism is more about politics and democracy than about ethnic attitudes.

Table 5: Determinants of Nationalism

Predictors	Bulgaria	Romania	Serbia	Slovakia	Hungary	Scales for
Status						
Education	-.076 *	-.076 *	NS	-.064 *	-.168 ***	Below 8 grad (3); university
Wealth	-.065 *	NS	-.086 **	-.114 ***	-.109 ***	Individual inc assessment of to very good
Age	.080 **	.067 **	NS	.063 *	.100 ***	4 steps: 18-3
Village	.126 ***	N/S	N/S	N/S	NS	Village (1), e
Majority member	.167 ***	.238 ***		.322 ***	NS	Belong to ma
Structural-psychological						
Trust only your kin	NS	.081 **		NS	NS	Likert scal
Ethnocentrism	-	.072**	-.277 ***	-	-	Factor scor attitude tov
Residual communism						

Authoritarianism and proxies	.079 **	.454***	.354 ***	.096 **	NS	Higher scores Principal c 2; Disagree system of g from 1 to 4 Agreement communism
Ideology irrelevant	.136 ***	.061 *	NS	NS	.111 ***	Dichotomous else (0)
Trust in politics	-.110 ***	NS	-.085 **	-.163 ***	--	Factor scores and prime maximum
Communism good idea	.151 ***	.059 *	NS	--	--	Likert scale
No party represents views					.141 ***	Likert scale
Context						
Threat		NS	.102 ***	-	-	For Serbia, threat pers For Roman you think s Yugoslavia to full agre
Frustration with transition	.093 ***	NS	--	.114 ***	.085**	Life compar better durin

Media consumption	-.200 ***	NS	NS	- 066 *	NS	Factor score radio. The
Nationalist leaders		NS	NS			Trust in Se Dichotom Romania w
Adjusted R square	27	39.5	35.3	18.4	12.8	

Legend: Entries are standardized coefficients (betas).

*** significant at 0.000 ;** significant at 0.00; significant at <0.05-0.00; ns: nonsignificant item.

Context factors vary greatly from one country to another, as we would expect. Threat is a very powerful predictor in the Serbian models and a weak one in the Kosovar and Romanian models. In the words of Dostoevsky's hero Stavroguine, "one needs a rabbit to cook a rabbit dish, and one needs a God to believe in God." In Serbia, the rabbit is quite big-- the threat of separatist Kosovo and Montenegro. In Romania, it is hardly enough to make an appetizer, and in Kosovo, the international peacekeeping force acts as a strong deterrent of fears. The subjective threat varies from one region and one individual to another, but it originates in an actual threat.

Comparing one's present living standards to communist times ("frustration with transition") emerges as a determinant, especially in Hungary and Slovakia, the better off countries in the panel, which enjoyed better living standards even during communism. But it is also a determinant in Bulgaria, the poorest country in the panel. Leaders were tested only in the countries where they ran in elections under nationalistic programs, and in bivariate models, they turned up as predictors. This was the case for Tudor in Romania, and for both Kostunica and Seselj in Serbia. These models explained very little, however, and when adding additional controls, trust in leaders lost significance. *On the contrary, when explaining trust in leaders as a dependent variable, the nationalism scale featured as a predictor in all models with status controls.*

Nationalism in Hungary and Slovakia, the two Central European countries, is clearly grounded in the current performance of regimes in addition to the authoritarian legacies of communism. Unlike Bulgaria and especially Romania, which could be considered totalitarian regimes during the communist era, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as Serbia, enjoyed variants of goulash communism, a softer version of that political system. The discontent with the

political class, with politicians as well as institutions, and the feeling that politics do not address one's problems is common in all these countries and feeds nationalism. *The contrary is not true: the nationalism scale does not turn out a determinant in models predicting political trust, which is determined by personal experience with governance.* It seems, therefore, that distrust and disappointment with politics and politicians feeds nationalism, not the other way around. When deconstructing the more complex predictors of authoritarianism and distrust in other groups, one discovers a stronger social determinism. The authoritarian and the distrustful tend to be worse off, inactive, less educated, and old. *Trust in other ethnic groups proves, when treated as a dependent variable, to be influenced by self-esteem, more in Romania than in Serbia, but significantly in both.* Individuals with more self-esteem tend to show more trust in other ethnic groups, whether minorities or neighbors. In both Romania and Serbia, trust in other ethnic groups improves with education, but is not dependent on age and income. Personal acquaintance with at least one individual from the main rival group increases trust in Romania and decreases social distance in Kosovo. Contact does not discriminate between those with low trust and those with high trust in Serbia, where an individual's personal experience with others may be overridden by recent collective experiences. Psychological theory of ethnic conflict seems to work better when explaining ethnocentrism, a more basic attitude based on social comparison between groups, than nationalism, a complex social representation of self, country, and world.

Communism's most important legacy in regard to nationalism is therefore neither the readiness of leaders to make unscrupulous use of propaganda tools for their political survival (such leaders can be found anywhere) nor the unfreezing of so-called structural hatreds among nationalities long in conflict. It is the communist socialization of people into a culture of distrust and the strong enforcement of conformity, collectivism, and social envy, all of which foster nationalism. The object seems less important than the need it answers, which is a need

to assign blame rather than provide identity. This overall distrustful attitude (nationalists are more suspicious toward minorities, more conspiracy-minded, and more likely to believe that the transition did not change much but enriched the same people as did the communist regime) is combined with the perception of ethnic conflicts with other groups. Nationalism is a general distrustful and paranoiac orientation that does not really discern among its objects, which could include neighboring countries, minorities, the outside world, politicians, and even the winners of the transition, who could be conationals. The focus of postcommunism nationalism is poor.

The nationalistic syndrome does not explain why some people are mobilized to vote for nationalistic leaders and others are not, since those who vote for radical nationalists, such as Seselj in Serbia or Tudor in Romania, number fewer than the amount of people in the nationalist group. What differs among nationalists, making more than half of them more passive than the others? A look at the constituencies of the two leaders mentioned may provide some answers.

Table 5: Determinants of Voting for Radical Nationalists

Determinants	Vojislav Seselj		Vadim Tudor	
	Standardized coefficients (betas)		Standardized coefficients	
	Scales and wording		Scales and wording	
Income	NS	Cash individual income last month	NS	Cash individual income last month
Education	.139***	Below 8 grades (1); secondary (2); high school and vocational (3); university (4)	NS	Below 8 grades (1); secondary (2); high school and vocational (3), university (4)

Age	NS	4 steps: 18–30 (1); 30–45 (2); 45–60 (3); over 60 (4)	>45 1.14*	4 steps: 18–30 (1); 30–45 (2); 45–60 (3); over 60 (4)
Male	NS	Dichotomous, male (1)	1.76*	Dichotomous
Village	.073**	Dichotomous, village (1); rest (0)	1.76*	Dichotomous, village (1); rest (0)
Active	NS	Actively employed (1); else (0)	-.405**	Actively employed (1); else (0)
Interest in politics	.239**	Factor score of reading, watching, and discussing political news from never (1) to daily (4)	NS	Factor score of reading, watching, and discussing political news from never (1) to daily (4)
Nationalism (variant 1)	.192***	Index, see appendix 2	NS	Index, see appendix 2
Adj. R ²	.071		—	
Authoritarianism (variant 2)	.073***	Index, see appendix 2	.706**	Index, see appendix 2
Adjusted R ²	.087		.10	

Legend: For Seselj, linear regression, with dependent trust measured from 1 to 4. For Tudor, logistic regression, with vote preference as dependent (1 vote, 0 other candidates).

*** significant at 0.000; ** significant at 0.00; significant at <0.05-0.00; ns: nonsignificant item.

Social status explanatory models of the preference for Seselj or Tudor illustrate some similarities, as well as some important differences. Seselj’s voters are less educated. In the

case of Tudor, education does not discriminate among voters and nonvoters. Income also does not predict preference. Tudor's voters are more likely male and reside in villages; those employed, rather than the retired or unemployed, are less likely to prefer him. Seselj's followers are more likely to be recruited among those who follow politics closely, while, in the case of Tudor, media consumption makes no difference in his acceptance or rejection. The most important finding, however, is not based on the social structure of these constituencies. The scale of nationalism, although a predictor with basic status controls only, loses significance when tested in more complex models in the case of Tudor, and accounts for less variance in the case of Seselj than the scale of authoritarianism, which is also a powerful predictor in the Tudor model. *The conclusion is thus that authoritarianism is at least as important as nationalism when predicting support for national mobilization.* Authoritarianism and nationalism are of course correlated, and authoritarianism is a determinant of nationalism. Still, when tested separately, authoritarianism proves more powerful in explaining the vote for radical nationalists. Both leaders are actually running on programs that are overtly antidemocratic, in addition to being nationalistic.

And State-seeking Ones. . .

After this review of nationalism among majorities, those who have a state of their own, the time has come to examine Kosovo more closely. Kosovo is a different story, requiring different treatment. In the Brubaker triad, Kosovo stands as a national minority, similar to Hungarians in Serbia, Romania, or Slovakia, and Turks in Bulgaria. Yet unlike these minorities, due to various historical circumstances (Malcolm, 1998), Kosovars became concentrated in one region. Although formally a part of Serbia, this region enjoyed a status

similar to that of a republic in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1989. It was later stripped of its autonomous status, and the reaction to that led to the escalation that ultimately brought the recent war. Due to their history of conflict with a communist Yugoslav state dominated by a Serb policy, Kosovars built a separate society within the borders of the communist state, an island with informal institutions--from schools to courts--substituted to the formal ones. Kosovo is now an international protectorate and a would-be nationalizing state itself, with a shrinking Serb minority and international peacekeepers standing between what is left of the minority and the Albanian majority. While Kosovars definitely aspire to a state of their own and will not settle for anything less, they do not have one yet. And while Kosovars and their institutions have opinions on the province's relationship with the West and a sense of what Kosovar citizenship means, at this moment, they do not set their own domestic or international policies. Because of this, the four-step nationalism scale used for consolidated states does not fit Kosovo well. Kosovars do not have an official language, and even their borders are not yet formally their own. While I did test three of the components of the scale separately, a model to explain Kosovar nationalism, *a state-seeking nationalism of a former minority*, called for a different approach. Results from the survey in Kosovo show how an embattled minority can transform itself, given the proper conditions, into a nationalizing state. Presently, only a small minority (18 percent) of Kosovars are interested in reuniting with Albania. Instead most want their own state protected, but not patronized, by the international community. Many also aspire to reunite with the Albanians in Macedonia. (Our respondents indicated Macedonia as the reason they agreed with the question asking whether Kosovo has territories in other countries.) Few Kosovars see any chance for cohabitation between Serbs and Albanians in the future. Nor do Kosovars—Serbs and Albanians alike--aspire to the solution preferred by the international community, a loose confederation on the model of Serbia and Montenegro, with Kosovo as the third element. From the entire sample, including

Serbs, less than 1 percent of both ethnic groups endorsed this solution (see table 6). This seems to back the argument that the conflict is between states and minorities rather than between ethnic groups (Caplan and Pfeiffer, 1996).

Table 6: Kosovo: Attitudes Toward Cohabitation and the State’s Future

Agreement with . . .	%
Members of one’s own ethnic group are more trustworthy than other people	67
The conflict between Kosovars and Serbs still exists	77
Blame for the conflict belongs with Serbs (including Serbs from Kosovo, Serbia, and Serbian political leaders)	89
History matters for present lives (agree fully and to a great extent)	77
Parts of other countries should belong to us (fully agree only)	79
Good Serbian-Albanian cohabitation is still possible in the future (agree fully and to a great extent)	27
It is time to run own affairs (agree fully and to a great extent)	80
Independence in the present borders is the best solution	74
Unification with Albania is the best solution	18

While the Kosovars’ situation as a minority protected by an international peace force and governed by an international government is exceptional, their situation as a minority with a clear territorial base is far from uncommon in Eastern Europe, and compares well with

many similar enclaves in the former Soviet Union. Even Kosovo's symbolic status is not singular. Transylvania plays a similar symbolic role for Hungary, even though the majority population has been Romanian since the eighteenth century. Macedonia is in a comparable situation toward Greece. What makes Kosovo unusual is its long history of dissent and its recent parallel life within the communist Yugoslav state. Starting with the demonstrations in 1968, Kosovars had a high awareness that the political arrangements were not equitable to them when compared to the proper Yugoslav republics. Most Albanians in both Kosovo and Macedonia organized their existence separately from, and at times in opposition to, the state, especially after 1970. The legacy of this existence on the borderlands of the communist society is still apparent in the difficulty of making sense of demographic data in Kosovo. For example, high numbers report having graduated from ten classes of school, but there is no way to check this, due to the informal status of the schools. Similarly, income figures from Kosovo are unreliable, as well over a third of the active population is unemployed, registered work contracts are not the norm, and remittances from abroad are the main source of income for many families. Due to the high birth rate, the population is young, an unusual feature, as Kosovo's neighbors share the West European pattern of aging populations with a large share of the population retired. Not only ethnicity and religion (Muslim), but also demography and culture, make Kosovars different from many in the region. Even other Muslims, such as Bosniacs, do not share their clan-type organization and large families. Kosovars make a distinctive society, one differing not by a few traits exaggerated by nationalists (such as the difference between the Serbian and Croatian languages), but by many features. When measuring social distance between Kosovars and other ethnic groups, the results are striking. Most Kosovars would not want to share a town with any Slavs, regardless if Serbs, Montenegrins, or Macedonians. They are better disposed toward Americans and Germans and show moderate acceptance toward Bosnians. But they strongly disapprove of any marriage

outside their ethnic group. A representation of average ethnic tolerance toward each group (consisting of acceptance of others through sharing a town, immediate neighborhood, workplace, and marrying into one’s family, each given equal weight) is reproduced in table 7.

Table 7: Ethnic Acceptance in Kosovo

Ethnic group	Mean	Std. Deviation
Albanian	3.90	.49
American	2.50	1.27
German	2.42	1.30
Bosnian	2.08	1.47
Roma	1.18	1.40
Macedonian	.75	1.20
Montenegrin	.96	1.31
Serb	.66	1.10

Legend: Social distance scale reversed, with 4 as maximum acceptance and 0 as minimum acceptance.

The results are very eloquent. They show a tolerance of almost 100 percent toward Albanians, followed by large tolerance toward Germans and Americans, groups known mostly by Kosovars who have worked abroad and also as members of the international community working in Kosovo. The acceptance of these two control groups is rather high, but the likeliness that Germans or Americans any will settle in Kosovo is, of course, low to zero. Of groups living in close proximity, Bosnians fare better, being considered acceptable to share both town and neighborhood, while the Roma are acceptable to share town or village only.

Acceptance of the presence of any of the southern Slavs--be they Macedonians, Montenegrins, or Serbs--is very low, even when it comes to sharing the same town or village. Even though these three groups may consider themselves different and have taken steps to live in separate states in the past decade, for Kosovars, there is little difference among them. Social distance toward any potential neighbors likely to share the premises with Kosovars is therefore quite high. This is a closed community. Answers to the question asking if a conflict among Serbs and Albanians continues confirm the high perception of conflict. Minorities, such as Serbs (96 percent), and Bosnians (94 percent) answer affirmatively, compared to the slightly more moderate perception of Albanians (76 percent yes, and 9 percent no).

Table 8: Determinants of Nationalism in Kosovo

Predictors	Want own state	Scale nationalism	Ethnic acceptance	Cohabitation optimists	Scales and wording
Welfare	NS	NS	NS	.107**	Scale from minimal satisfaction (5) with the economic situation
Education	NS	NS	NS	-.082**	Did not finish 10 grades (1)
Age	-.136*** (under 35)	NS	NS	NS	4 steps; 16–25 (1), 24–35 (4)
Urban	-.073*	NS	-.115*	NS	Urban (1), else (0)
Regional development	NS	NS	NS	NS	Cumulative scale built by satisfaction with facilities in one's community
Threat	NS	126***	--	--	Likert scale, from no threat (5)
Trauma	.058*	.124*	NS	NS	Dichotomous violence due to

					community (1); else (0)
Nationalism scale	NS	--	--	-.104***	Factor score, see appendix 2
Tolerance Serbs	-.099**	NS	--	.396**	Social distance scale, with 1 (1) and 4 (4) and minimum acceptance
Ethnic tolerance	--	NS	--	--	Factor score, principal component toward Serbs, Bosnians, Macedonians; KMO = 0.74; from minimal tolerance to maximal
Acquainted with Serbs	--	--	.135***	--	Dichotomous, knows at least one
Blames Serbs	.099**	--	--	--	Dichotomous, blame attributed to violence, blame of Kosovo, Serbia, and Serb leaders agreed or else (0)
History matters	--	--	--	.095***	History matters for present (1) to disagreement (4)
Trust only your kin	NS	.060*	.069**	-.082** (trust only your ethnic group)	Likert scale, from 1 to 4, 4 no intermediate step
Variance explained %	14.5	4.7	6.5	20.1	

Legend: Multiple linear regression models, except “want own state” (logistic regression, dependent dichotomous).

Cohabitation optimism was worded as “Do you think Serbs and Albanians will be able to live together peacefully in Kosovo from now on?”

*** significant at 0.000; ** significant at 0.00; *significant at <0.05-0.00; ns: nonsignificant item.

Figures are standardized regression coefficients.

Using ethnic tolerance as a dependent variable in a multiple regression model, we find that higher tolerance is associated with political sophistication (regular reading of political reports in newspapers), residence in larger settlements rather than villages, and distrust of strangers. The most important determinant, however, is acquaintance with at least one member of the other ethnic group. People who have known a Serb personally are more likely to show acceptance than those who do not. Social distance toward Serbs predicts attitude toward independence: those with higher rates of tolerance are less likely to prefer independence. Those who do prefer independence, moreover, also blame only Serbs for the degradation of the reciprocal relationship. *Villagers and older people are significantly more in favor of independence than unification with Albania.* An important determinant of both nationalism and opting for independence is past violence in one's community during the war. Perception of a current threat is associated with people high on the nationalism scale. Finally, and most importantly, optimism about future cohabitation, though confined to a narrow section of the population, is associated with superior wealth and education, lower scores on the nationalism scale, and more trust beyond the borders of one's kin. Regional development and political trust did not turn out as predictors. *On the whole, Kosovar nationalism seems deeply rooted in recent history, with the gradual separateness of the community from the official state, followed by the trauma caused by the war.* At this point, it is impossible to discern if hostility toward Serbs is due to the war trauma and the preceding years of discrimination or is a more archaic attitude opposing Slavs and Albanians. The attitude toward other Slavs, such as Montenegrins and Macedonians, suggest that Albanians do not get along with any Slavs. But it is also true each of these groups had its own republic in the

former Yugoslavia, in which Albanians were still at the bottom of social hierarchy. As social-dominance theory predicts, the group in this lower position has little to no loyalty toward the state and its other constituents.


Conclusion: Nationalism as Ideology and Nationalism as Pathology


What emerges from the two previous sections is the confirmation of the idea that nationalisms, rather than nationalism, is what we are dealing with. They have much in common but many differences as well. One variety, the most widespread in the postcommunist world, is conformist nationalism, the nationalism of majorities who identify themselves with their states, have high rates of residual communism, and feel threatened by those who are different, especially when those people pose some challenge to the state and push for political or legal changes. This includes Brubaker's nationalizing states as well as homelands such as Hungary. The second variety is one that characterizes minorities, of which Kosovo is the extreme case. This brand of nationalism is also, in many ways, a legacy of communism, but it is also closer to minority nationalisms in Western Europe, sharing their main feature of development in opposition to the state. To resist communist conformism, strongly promoted by communist states, ethnic minorities retreated into their communities, and their social distance toward other groups grew. Their nationalism looks less political and more psychological because they have lived outside politics for so long. Similarities are remarkable, however, in the models of countries which are proper states. Throughout the postcommunist world, Balkans or not, the communist legacy, more than anything else, seems to drive the adherence to the nationalistic ideology. Communism was, with some exceptions (Romania, Albania, and North Korea) a universalistic ideology, preaching internationalism and brotherhood among socialist countries. As a result, its strong linkage with nationalism in

every country is, to some extent, surprising. Yet this is not the case when we examine the residual communist attitudes one by one. The type of political attitudes fostered by communism--conformity, distrust, fatalism, a political culture where the individual is a subject--are all excellent grounds for nationalism. Collectivism (the idea that “communism is a good idea badly put into practice”) is associated with both nationalistic and antidemocratic attitudes, overriding freedom and individualism. Similarly, the rejection of politics in its traditional sense, of the left-right spectrum, is a communist leftover, which feeds directly into nationalism. This socializes people into autocracy and conformity. Because of all this, communism laid the grounds for the nationalism of the nineties.

Due to its positive association with political fatalism and distrust in politics, nationalism emerges from our models as *a substitute ideology, a form of distinctive political identity*. Frustration and helplessness over the difficult transition, basic distrust in the outside world, lack of proper political information, and the habit of having one’s political thinking done by others all combine with residual collectivism, a collectivism so basic it does not identify with the left. Nationalism is the ideology of nonideologues, a form of political assertiveness of the less informed and more frustrated, popular because it puts the blame on foreigners or social groups viewed as secretive or occult-like, reactive because it draws on the real frustrations of transition and the presence of threats. But most of all, its essence is residual, as it draws on those with communist attitudes, authoritarianism, and nostalgia for the former regime.

Figure 2: A Model of Nationalism





The model in figure 2 sums up these findings and places them in the larger social context. An individual's personal status, such as the number of years lived under the communist regime, education, and the opportunities to be socialized in a larger world (determined by personal income and the region or place of residence) shapes his or her attitude as a rigid authoritarian or a more open-minded democrat, as well as the propensity to trust or distrust. The complex of attitudes related to communist socialization, labeled residual communism, has the strongest influence in determining nationalism. A weaker role is played by more basic psychological factors, such as reticence to trust foreigners and perception of other ethnic groups as inferior to one's own, grounded in an individual self-esteem. But these

two groups of factors combined still need a specific context to produce nationalism, instead of, say, left-wing populism. Each and every one of the countries surveyed has these conditions, as they all have a national issue, be it minorities perceived as separatist, neighbors suspected of being unsettled with borders, or conationals living in neighboring states as minorities. As such, each has a perceived threat.

Once this considerable mass of nationalistic attitudes is known to exist, the issue of mobilization of passive individual attitudes into some form of actual social behavior--or, on the contrary, of preventing mobilization--becomes the crucial issue. And here is where leaders matter. Wherever we have basic nationalistic attitudes, leaders are bound to use them when everything else fails. In the case of Milosevic, this occurred when economic reforms failed to revive the communist economy. In other cases, it happened when leaders saw their popularity drop, or sometimes simply because the left and right positions were already occupied by other leaders. This is not to belittle their manipulative skills. Milosevic had an exceptional favorable situation as a prime secretary of the Communist Party, and he was able to manipulate the circumstances to pass from this nonelected position to an elected one. But had he not enjoyed this privileged position, it is likely that another nationalist leader, from the ranks of the noncommunist opposition perhaps, would have tried successfully to capitalize on the generalized perception of threat in the aftermath of secessions shaking the former Yugoslavia. Attitudes and contexts together simply favor nationalist leaders over other leaders. But once empowered, they will call for further mobilization. They will increase the threat that empowered them in the first place.

Both former communists and political newcomers extensively relied on nationalistic rhetoric during the transition. The only parties that resisted this are the smaller liberal parties, which usually draw on urban and educated constituencies, such the late Zoran Djindjic's party in Serbia, former president Emil Constantinescu's party in Romania, the Slovakian Christian

Democrats, Bulgaria's Liberal Party, and the Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary. These parties have never formed the government, except in the framework of larger coalitions, which included at least one party drawing on nationalistic constituencies. By including these parties in the coalitions, nationalism was tamed. Moreover, in Bulgaria, Romania, and, more recently, Slovakia, parties representing the ethnic minority were also included in these broad coalitions. The experience of these three states, which are unitary states, illustrates that once an ethnic party is given a share of power in central and local governments, it becomes an important third actor in the game, making it more likely that parties from across the spectrum will consider some alliance with it. The positive experience of Bulgaria and Romania illustrated that even former communists, those whom Gallagher (1995) considers national communists, adopted such alliances with parties of minorities, originally initiated by liberals with antinationalistic constituencies. Of course, external conditionality and the EU accession process created a strong incentive for political elites to behave in such a liberal fashion. Nonetheless, in this way, even parties drawing on nationalistic constituencies were able to cheat their voters and contribute to liberalization. The contrary was true in the former Yugoslavia, where the stake was not sharing the state, but partitioning it. The manipulation of threat there allowed leaders to increase nationalism and to mobilize large numbers of followers to vote or even fight in the war. *Similar figures of public support for nationalistic attitudes can therefore lead to very different outcomes in different contexts.*

Context is essential for both basic nationalist attitudes and mobilization. If a threat is not present, or if there is a consensus among political elites that the manipulation of a threat is unacceptable (for instance, on the topic of European integration and national identity), grassroots nationalism may linger with little political consequence. The electoral outcome of mobilization also depends on the political status of politicians (it works better for members of the opposition in democracies and incumbents in autocracies) and the political alternatives.

Whenever political alternatives are perceived as attractive and realistic (for example, European integration), nationalists lose elections to pro-European parties. In other words, there is considerable room for manipulation of electoral outcomes through the manipulation of contexts, that is, the reduction of threat and increase in incentives.

Nationalist and populist leaders fare well in the Balkans. But seeing the issues and the people, the question is actually why they do not fare even better. Not even Milosevic had absolute majorities. He benefited from the majority system when first elected through a popular vote, and he was never again able to win the support of more than relative majorities. In Bulgaria, no politician appeals to nationalism; such issues simply do not exist. In the second round of Romania's presidential election in 2000, the opposition to Tudor's returns in the first round led to an intense mobilization against his candidacy. As a result, in the second round, he garnered fewer votes. In that case, an extensive media campaign showed the public how a Tudor victory would affect the country's European accession, the main political project of domestic elites. The same happened in Slovakia, in the 2002 elections, when strong pressure from the international community determined that Meciar, a populist-nationalist leader, ended up as an isolated opposition politician, despite the fact that he received the largest share of the votes (although just 20 percent). Hungary's Viktor Orban showed his nationalist stripes during debate backing the Status Law, when he vowed to extend citizenship to all Hungarian-speakers in the region. Ultimately, he lost both the legislative and local elections, despite scoring high percentages of the vote.

Nationalism becomes dangerous when everything else, both politics and policy, fails. It is *preceded* by a perceived drop in political choices, even if later it itself subverts political choice. Where choice exists, grassroots nationalism is not powerful enough to compete with it. Invited to join Europe in 2004, both Slovakia and Hungary may retain nationalistic publics and politicians, but their importance is bound to decrease as the stake becomes minimal to

nonexistent. If Romania and Bulgaria manage to stay on course of European integration, they are likely to follow the same path. However, as long as some voters still do not believe that politics works or the state can deliver the goods, discourses ranging from populism to nationalism through a spectrum of combinations will continue to appeal. Their importance will vary with the threat. It is larger in Serbia, minimal in Romania, and absent in Bulgaria.

The model pictured in this chapter is a model of banal nationalism. It was not designed to explain atrocities, as a survey is clearly not the tool to do that. The contribution of most people in creating exceptional circumstances is small--and is manifested mostly through voting nationalist in elections or referenda. Most people would not commit atrocities, although in any society there are groups who feel dispossessed and are aware of the opportunity of the spoils of ethnic war. The circumstances that empower such groups are beyond the scope of this chapter. The passive nationalists pictured in this chapter are not criminals, but they are insensitive to a certain category of crimes when committed in the name of their values. But is this blindness different from any other ideology? Nationalism is not more powerful than other ideologies. This is apparent in the many elections it loses, as well as in the bloody records of two other authoritarian ideologies--communism and fascism. To defeat nationalism, one has to manipulate contexts (from the political agenda to the political alternative) rather than people. Many of the region's nationalists, including Milosevic's voters, can recognize a good political choice when offered one.

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Appendix 1. The six surveys

Country	Number questioned (OK?)	Interview dates	Pollster
Bulgaria (all)	1,161	March 2000	CSD (Center for the Study of Democracy)
Hungary (all)	988	Nov.–Dec . 1993	MODUS

Kosovo Albanians	911	July–Aug ust 2002	RIINVEST (UNDP/EWR)
Romania (all)	1,001	October 2001	CURS-SAR (UNDP/EWR)
Serbia (Serbs)	1,200	May 2002	CPS (Center for Policy Studies)
Slovakia (all)	1,011	March 2000	GFK

Appendix 2: Scales for Nationalism and Authoritarianism

Nationalism	Principal component. Factor loadings	Keiser-Meyer-Olin
Slovakia	People who cannot speak the official language should not have the right to vote	.764
	No foreign country or international organization should be able to tell us how to run our own country	.715 KMO = .610
	There are ethnic groups living within this country that pose a threat to our sovereignty and borders	.688

Bulgaria	There are ethnic groups living within this	.771	
	country that pose a threat to our sovereignty and		KMO = .710
	borders		
	People who cannot speak the official language	.689	
	should not have the right to vote.		
	There are parts of neighboring countries which	.756	
	should belong to us		
Serbia	There are parts of neighboring countries which	.756	
	should belong to us		KMO= .710
	People who cannot speak the official language	.689	
	should not have the right to vote.		
	No foreign country or international organization	.611	
	should be able to tell Serbians how to run their		
	own country		
Kosovo	There are parts of neighboring countries which	.651	
	should belong to us		
	No foreign country or international organization	.771	KMO = .586
	should be able to tell Kosovars how to run their		
	own country		
	There are ethnic groups living within this	.692	
	country that pose a threat to our sovereignty and		
	borders		
Hungary	People who cannot speak the official language	.677	
	should not have the right to vote.		KMO = .550
	There is a risk of turning into a colony of West	.597	

	There are parts of other countries which should belong to us	.652	
Romania	There are ethnic groups living within this country that pose a threat to our sovereignty and borders	.657	KMO = .687
	People who cannot speak the official language should not have the right to vote.	.744	
	There are parts of neighboring countries which should belong to us	.540	
	No foreign country or international organization should be able to tell Romanians how to run their own country	.759	

Legend: All variables initially coded with agreement (1) to disagreement (4) for analysis codes were reverted.

Authoritarianism	Principal component. Factor loadings	Keiser-Meyer-Olin
Romania	Most people behave properly only when led by a strong hand	.773
	The same people enjoy privileges now as during communism	.509
		KMO = .790

	Romania is a country both rich and beautiful but its many enemies prevent the country from achieving the prosperity it deserves	.690	
	No point in holding election if the country is run by the same small group at the top	.758	
Serbia	Serbia is a country both rich and beautiful but its many enemies prevent the country from achieving the prosperity it deserves	.800	KMO = .540
	Most people behave properly only when led by a strong hand	.706	
	This country would be better off if inferior groups stayed in their place	.554	

SHOULD YOU INCLUDE THE LEGEND HERE? Authoritarianism questions adjusted after Adorno *et al.*, 1982. Self-esteem question (“Sometimes I feel I am no good at all”) adjusted from Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992.