Who is Afraid of EU Enlargement?
Labour Migration Policies in the European Union
Italy and the United Kingdom

By

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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Degree
Master of Arts in International Relations and European Studies

International Relations and European Studies Department

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17,099 words

Budapest, Hungary
2007
After all that has been said of the levity and inconsistency of human nature, it appears evidently from experience that a person is of all sorts of luggage the most difficult to be transported (Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*).
Abstract:

After the 2004 and the 2007 EU Enlargement rounds, the EU-15 member states implemented different transitional arrangements towards the A8 (the new member states which entered the EU in 2004, except Cyprus and Malta) and the A2 (Romania and Bulgaria). My thesis will discuss the case of the United Kingdom and Italy because they adopted significant changes in their labour migration policies towards the new member states. While the UK had an open-door policy towards the A8 in 2004, the British government announced restrictive measures towards Romanian and Bulgarian workers in 2007. Italy represents a different case, because it proved to be more flexible in 2007 than in 2004 in relation to admittance of A2 workers. The cases become more interesting when we consider the estimated number of immigrants from A2 to the two old member states. The UK imposed restrictions towards two countries that do not have a tradition of migrating to Britain, while Italy adopted a more open policy towards Romanians, who have a specific preference of migrating there. I will attempt to determine the specific reasons that could explain the shift in the preferences of the two countries. In order to do this, I shall look at the chain migration model, immigration and labour migration traditions/patterns/policies in Italy and the UK, and at the importance of the migration issue in the political and public discourse in the two countries. Italy and UK can be used as examples of two old member states that have different domestic interests regarding labour migration. The two case studies illustrate that a common labour immigration policy at the level of the European Union is still not possible, although the recommendations of the European Commission stress the benefits of the freedom of labour for the member states.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dorothee Bohle, for her patience and for showing me the right direction with this piece of work. Special thanks to Alin Chindea (who was a life saver and offered me precious information, essential for this thesis), to Robin Bellers, (who patiently read and corrected my paper), and to Andrew Cartwright (who was kind enough to share some of his knowledge about Romanian labour migration with me).
Table of Contents

**Introduction** ................................................................. 6

**1. Labour Migration in the European Union** ................. 12
   1.2 Freedom of Movement and Transitional Arrangements .......... 12
   1.2 National Responses in 2004 and 2007 ................. 14

**2. The “Migratory Chain”** ........................................... 17
   2.1. The Theoretical Approach ....................................... 17
   2.2 “Migratory Chains” in the United Kingdom and Italy ........ 21
      2.2.1 Polish Immigration to the UK: History and Expectations .... 22
      2.2.2 Romanian Emigration to Italy: the Post-Communist Flow .... 24

**3. Managing Migration: Two Different Stories** .......... 29
   3.1 Italy’s Labour Migration Policy .................................. 29
      Priority: Low and Medium Skilled Foreign Workforce .......... 29
   3.2. United Kingdom’s Immigration Policy: ....................... 35
      Priority: Highly Skilled Foreign Workforce .................... 35

**4. Public and Political Attitudes in Italy and United Kingdom: What is Different?** ............................................................... 46
   4.1 Italy: Illegality Comes First .................................... 47
   4.2 United Kingdom: Economic Impact of Labour Migrants ........ 51

**Conclusion** ................................................................... 58

**Appendixes**
Introduction

In the light of the new EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, migration has been widely discussed and analyzed, with a special emphasis on labour movement from one member state to another (Geddes 2000, Joppke 2001, Carrera and Formisano 2005). The main area that has been under debate refers to trans-national regulation and standardized policy making in the field of labour migration (Lahav 2004, Vink 2005). With the abolition of internal borders and the promotion of free movement of persons, labour migration is a policy issue that quite naturally seems to call for a common European approach. However, until now, it seems improbable that this policy could be adopted and implemented because the national interests of the member states would be, in some cases, seriously damaged (Lahav 2004, Geddes 2003).

When analyzing the issue of labour migration, it is obvious that the EU member states have non-uniform policies. The transitional arrangements, which are adopted separately at the domestic level, are illustrative. The EU countries have the option of either imposing work restrictions for the new member states or to allow the free access on their labour markets or for some particular sectors (The European Commission: Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities). In 2004, most of the EU-15 chose the restrictive policies (with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Sweden). In 2007, although the majority of the EU-15 countries maintained their initial policies, several member states shifted their position: Finland opened its borders, France and Italy adopted an open-partially policy, while the UK and Ireland imposed transitional arrangements. The cases of the United Kingdom and Italy show the most interesting and significant changes. The UK was one of the three old member states that did not impose restrictions in 2004, but in 2007, it adopted a restrictive approach towards the workers from Romania and Bulgaria. Italy imposed work
restrictions in 2004, but proved to be more open to workers from the A2, by opening important sectors.

The issue in question poses the following research questions:

- Why would a country (the UK) that did not experience significant labour migration from Romania and Bulgaria restrict the access to their labour market when 2 years prior they opened their borders for the A8 workers?

- Why would a country that experiences a huge inflow of labour migration from Romania open its labour market (moreover, in areas that are targeted by Romanians), and not adopt the same inflexibility as in 2004?

The European Union encourages the freedom of movement, but also defines “migrant workers” and “transitional agreements” (Art. 39EC), allowing the member states to adopt their own policies and choose whether they restrict or open their borders. The EU-15 provisions in the field of labour migration are illustrative for the lack of a common approach to this particular issue (Lahav 2004, Carrera 2005, Vink 2005). The majority of debates about transitional arrangements focus on the “big picture” and the lack of a coherent European common immigration policy, and not on particular countries and on their domestic reasons for adopting extensive or restrictive policies. Even when particular countries are under analysis, there is more of a descriptive, historical approach to the issue. (Geddes 2000, Chaloff 2005, Levinson 2005, Kelly 2005). My contribution to the literature will consist in trying to go in depth into the domestic reasons that pushed certain member states to be more or less restrictive towards labour migration. Having this particular aim, I shall analyse the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom in an effort to link their migration policies with their domestic interests and to explain their shift in decisions.

By bringing the domestic elements together in a comparable manner, it is observable that both countries seem to have acted against their labour market goals due to the pressure from the European Union, but in opposite directions. While the UK wanted to prove itself closer to EU
principles (Buonfino 2005, Wintour 2004), after marginalizing itself by opting out of Schengen and the Euro zone (Wintour 2004), Italy was under pressure to deal with its border control issues and with the high degree of illegality that the country experienced over the last 20 years (Buonfino 2005, Reyneri 2007).

The chain migration approach sees migration as self-perpetuating, because family members, friends or acquaintances inevitably follow the individual worker in the host country (Boissevain 1974, Hollifield 1992, Massey 1990). Thomas Faist (2000) asks the question: “Why are there so many international migrants out of so few places”, to which he sees chain migration as a good explanation. The framework can offer an explanation for why Polish immigration to the UK should have been expected, if we consider that there was already a strong community in the country before the 2004 accession (Burrel, Sword 1996, Lachowicz 2007). Also, this approach illustrates the strong links that have been established between Italy and Romania through labour networks (Constantin 2006, Sandu 2006). The puzzle arises from the fact that neither of the countries imposed restrictions towards the countries that already had significant communities in the UK (Polish) and Italy (Romania).

The literature on chain migration also states that a large inflow of migrants in one host country can lead to the transformation of the phenomenon in a “meta-issue”, by augmenting the real economic and social impact of the foreigners (Faist 2000, Bohning and De Beijl 2002). Considering these arguments, it is significant to analyze the way in which the UK and Italy established their priorities regarding their immigration policies over time and then to look at the political and public discourse, which is thought to have a great impact on the way the host country’s citizens perceive migrants (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2005). While the media made use of negative clichés in both countries, prior to the A2 accession, public perception did not suffer major changes either in the UK or Italy, but the political choices differed in their approach towards labour migration.
I have two major hypotheses:

H1- In 2004, neither the UK nor Italy’s policies regarding work migration were in line with their labour market goals. When analyzing their immigration and labour policies in the UK, one can observe that and the fact that its labour migration policies had been restrictive since 1961 (Goulbourne 1991, Geddes 2001, Geddes 2003). Italy closed its labour market for the A8 in 2004, although its needs were represented by low and medium-skilled foreign workforce and its immigration policies since 1986 encouraged this kind of labour (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2005, Constantin 2006, Reyneri 2007).

H2- In 2007, both countries adopted policies that were in line with their labour market goals. For the UK the transitional arrangements are in line with its traditional restrictive policies and with the expressed need to attract a highly skilled workforce (Srikandarajah, IPPR FactFiles 2004). The centre-left and centre-right convergence on “managed migration” (Johnston 2007), and the public discourse which focuses on the economic impact of labour migrants (Cracknell, Green 2007) are also significant elements that explain the 2007 approach. Italy opened important sectors for the low and medium-skilled workers from the A2 in 2007, in accordance with its labour market needs (Triandafyllidou 2005, Constantin 2006, Reyneri 2007). The negative clichés of Romanian workers, promoted by the Italian media (Buonfino 2006, Triandafyllidou 2005), were overcome by political dialogue and by the bilateral agreements between the two countries.

My work fills a gap in the literature, in the sense that is an early attempt to compare two EU-member states in terms of their labour migration policies and to provide an explanation for their shift in preferences regarding the transitional arrangements between 2004 and 2007.

Methodologically, the thesis is structured as a comparative analysis of Italy’s and United Kingdom’s labour migration policies, with a special focus on the elements that could explain their choices related to the transitional arrangements after the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargement rounds. In the first chapter, which brings forward the notions of “migrant worker”
and “transitional arrangements”, I look at official EU documents, statements, and at the specific transitional arrangements adopted by the EU-15 in 2004 and 2007, to see in which way member states proved to be more or less restrictive to intra-EU labour migration.

The second chapter starts with the description of the “chain migration” approach, which I then use as a basis for explaining why the UK should have expected significant immigration from Poland, while this is not the case for Romania. By using historical data and comparing statistical evidence, I illustrate that there was already a significant Polish community in the UK that could explain the post-accession inflow. The data also shows that the preferred destinations for Romanian workers remain Italy and Spain, with over 50%, while only 4.6% expressed their interest for the UK. In the next section, I focus on the way the two countries dealt with the issues of migration over time. In order to compare their traditions and policies in this particular field, I analyze the main Immigration Acts that were adopted in both the UK and Italy to see how they reflect the specific needs of the two labour markets. For this analysis, I look into the previous literature on immigration patterns in the two countries, reports issued by the International Organization for Migration, as well as statistical data regarding the number of foreign workers and the sector distribution. The data available for the two countries show their preference for low/medium skilled (Italy) or high skilled (UK) foreign workforce, in line with their labour market goals.

In the last chapter, I look at the public and political discourse in the two countries in order to observe any differences that could explain the different attitudes of Italy and the UK in 2004/2007. As a way to measure the public opinion regarding immigration/labour migration, I use the Eurobarometer (2003, 2004, and 2006) for both Italy and the UK and try to link it to the media discourse in the two countries. In order to assess the importance of the political element in the migration discourse, I look at the position of the main political parties on migration issues and
whether this discourse is convergent or divergent between the centre-left and centre-right. For this, I use official documents, newspaper articles and scholarly works.

This thesis can be considered an attempt to provide some possible explanation for the attitude of the two countries in the field of labour migration. It does not assert that it is the only possible way of interpreting them. Bearing in mind the very recent enlargement and the limited time that has passed since Italy and the UK announced their official position for 2007, this attempt represents an early contribution to the existent literature.
1. Labour Migration in the European Union

This chapter introduces the notions of freedom of movement and transitional arrangements, as they are defined at the EU level. It also describes the type of restrictions that were imposed in 2004 by the EU-15 and shows how their policies changed by the 2007 enlargement. The brief analysis aims at illustrating that the UK and Italy are cases worth studying, due to their shift in preferences regarding labour migration.

1.2 Freedom of Movement and Transitional Arrangements

Free movement of persons is one of the fundamental freedoms within the European Union, which is guaranteed by Community Law.\(^1\) It is considered to be the most important right present under the Community law, one that is essential with regard to the formation of the European citizenship.

Since the formation of the European Community in 1957, the freedom of movement for workers existed under article 39 of the EC Treaty. This particular article stipulates\(^2\):

1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.

2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment.

3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:
   
   (a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
   
   (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;

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(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;

(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.

Article 39 EC applies to what is called ‘migrant workers’, which are defined as ‘nationals of one Member State who leave their country of origin and go to work in another Member State. This article applies only to workers of the EU Member States and not to self-employed persons, students, retired persons or non-active people. The European Court of Justice also defined the concept of ‘worker’ as someone who: “(1) undertakes genuine and effective work (2) under the direction of someone else (3) for which he is paid.”

The EU states are not allowed to discriminate directly or indirectly against migrant workers on the basis of their nationality. Among the equal treatment provisions there are also social assistance, fiscal advantages and public housing. However, according to the Accession Treaty of 2003, the EU-15 obtained the right to voluntarily introduce work restrictions towards the A10 (2004). The Accession Treaty of 2005 gave them the right to impose these arrangements to the A2 countries as well.

The general definition of work restrictions, which are called transitional arrangements, can be found on the website of the European Commission:

The transitional arrangements in the Accession Treaties of 16 April 2003 regarding the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, and of 25 April 2005 regarding the accession of Bulgaria and Romania provide that for the first two years following accession access to the labour markets of the EU Member States that formed part of the EU before the respective accessions will depend on the national law and policy of those Member States. In practical terms, this means that a worker from one of the Member States that acceded is likely to need a work permit.

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
These national restrictions can be extended to three years, with the possibility for the member states to prolong it with another two years if they can prove that their labor market was seriously disturbed by labor migration from the new member states. The old member states are obliged to eliminate all work restrictions until 2009 for the A8 members, respectively until 2011 for the A2 members.\(^5\)

### 1.2 National Responses in 2004 and 2007

In May 2004, ten new Member states joined the European Union, and the “Old” 15 Member States had the option to impose the so-called “transitional arrangements” for the new member states (The European Commission: Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities). Only three of the fifteen “Old” Member States opened their labour markets: Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The labour markets of the other 12 states were restricted and regulated through a series of bilateral agreements and measures, which meant for the majority of cases that the A8 nationals were obliged to apply for work permits before starting to work in the EU-15.\(^6\)

In 2007, most of the EU-15 restricted the access to their labour markets for the Romanian and Bulgarian workers, with a few notable exceptions. France and Italy adopted an open-partially labour migration policy, while Finland and Sweden decided to open their labour markets. UK and Ireland decided to shift from an open-door policy (2004) to a restricted one (2007). (Appendix 1)

**Restricted:** Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Romanian and Bulgarian citizens no longer require visas but they are allowed to work in one of these member states only if they have a work permit, obtained prior to their arrival in the host country. Only self-employed persons who qualify are exempt from the work permit requirement. There is a specific requirement for a specific offer

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\(^5\) Ibid.

of employment or an employment contract between the worker and the employer. Except for the
UK and Ireland, all the other EU-15 in this category also imposed restrictive policies after the
2004 accession. The specific requirements for the UK and Ireland are the following:

**The United Kingdom (UK):**  
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals must either obtain the appropriate authorization from the UK authorities, in the form of a registration certificate or an accession worker card, or demonstrate that they are exempt from this requirement. Those exempt include (but are not limited to) highly skilled workers; self-employed workers; workers providing services on behalf of an employer in another EEA country; and workers who are already in the UK and have held valid employment authorization for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 months as of December 31, 2006. Bulgarian and Romanian nationals are eligible to apply for accession worker cards if they intend to undertake certain categories of employment in the UK or if a UK employer first obtains approval for them under the existing work permit arrangements.

**Ireland:** Bulgarian and Romanian nationals continue to require work permits and any job to be filled by such a national continues to be subject to a labor market test. Employers will be expected to satisfy their labor market requirements from within the European Economic Area (EEA) first and if this is not possible they will be expected to give preference to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals over non-EEA nationals.

**Open Partially:** France and Italy

**France:** Salaried Bulgarian and Romanian nationals continue to require work permits as before accession and must obtain residence permits for stays of 90 days or more. However, work permits will be issued automatically for jobs in designated fields in which there are shortages. Bulgarian and Romanian nationals may now establish companies or work on a self-employed basis without

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7 Romanian Office for Labour Migration: United Kingdom.  

8 Romanian Office for Labour Migration: Ireland.  

9 Romanian Office for Labour Migration: France.  
obtaining prior authorization; however, they must still obtain residence permits in these cases. Bulgarian and Romanian nationals no longer require work permits if they are employed by a Bulgarian or Romanian company and seconded to a French company to provide services.

**Italy:** 10 Bulgarian and Romanian nationals may enter Italy freely with a valid passport to work 1) as managers or highly skilled workers; 2) in the agriculture, hotel/tourism, engineering, or construction industries; or 3) as seasonal, domestic, or autonomous workers. For all other types of workers, there is a simplified work permit process that will be in place for one year in order to monitor the labor market. This process entails completing a special work permit (*nulla osta*) application designed for new EU states and sending it by registered mail to the *Sportello Unico* at the Prefecture. The Prefecture will then issue the work permit. Once the work permit has been granted, Bulgarian and Romanian nationals are no longer required to apply for work visas in their home countries to enter Italy. Like nationals of other EU countries, all Bulgarian and Romanian nationals must apply for a residence permit (*Carta di Soggiorno*) at the local police office (*Questura*) or post office within 90 days of entry.

**Open:** Finland and Sweden. In these two countries Romanian and Bulgarian citizens have unrestricted access to the labour market. 11

Significant changes in labour migration policy occurred in the case of the United Kingdom, which chose to end its open door policy in 2007 towards workers in the new member states, and Italy, whose labour migration provisions towards Romania and Bulgaria are more relaxed than those adopted in 2007 towards the A8, by opening important sectors. The challenge consists in addressing the main reasons that determined the two countries to change their preferences in relation to the transitional arrangements.

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2. The “Migratory Chain”

In relation to the Polish labour migration to the UK and the huge inflow of Romanian workers in Italy, it is important to explain the phenomenon of chain migration. This theoretical approach indicates that the United Kingdom should have expected a large inflow of Polish people after 2004, if we consider that there was already a significant Polish community in the country. I argue that the massive Polish immigration would not have happened without the already existing community. As there is no significant Romanian or Bulgarian community in the UK, it is highly improbable that a comparable inflow of workers would have come to the United Kingdom even without the labour restrictions. As this approach illustrates, the host countries tend to transform the issue of immigration in a “meta-issue” when they are under migratory pressure, by exaggerating the impact of foreigners. In this sense, the “chain migration” approach will also serve as basis for the next two chapters, which deal with the immigration policies of the UK and Italy, and with the political and public discourse in the two countries.

2.1. The Theoretical Approach

In Europe, scholars have identified the so-called “migratory chain”, which means that the initial temporary or guest-worker migration becomes gradually more permanent and consequently more political, because of the effects migration has on the host country. This theory sees work migration as self perpetuating, because family members, friends or acquaintances inevitably follow the individual worker to the host country. Thomas Faist asks the question: “Why are there so many international migrants out of so few places” to which he sees chain migration as a good explanation. Once the initial migration has taken place, the costs for moving abroad decrease and

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the whole process is gradually simplified. Sociologists also stress the importance of an existing network in a host country, consisting of family and friends. This becomes extremely important for the potential work migrants because it diminishes the monetary and social costs and risks that would otherwise exist. Other authors identify the migratory networks as a form of social capital or “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognitions”, which in turn become convertible in other forms of social capital. Migration gives birth to these networks, but the networks also determine more migration.

The main idea of migration networks is that there is a more intense exchange of people between certain countries and a less intense one between others. According to scholars, these networks are characterized by a relative large flow number of migrants between the countries that are already in a system of exchange, compared to significant smaller flows between countries that established weak levels of exchange. This approach indicates that the international migration networks are regionally limited and that there is generally a nucleus region, which may very well be a country or a group of countries that experience uncommonly large migrant flows. The most favourable conditions for the population flows between countries are created by the existence of prior strong linkages. In this way, we can make a distinction between possible sending countries and host countries on a scale that goes from weak to strong. Strong ties are generally considered

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as those which involve interactive civil societies, and secondary associations exchanging goods and people. The weak links are those which involve less exchange between the countries in the political and economic areas.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the “migratory chain” model indicates that the individual nation-states are in particular open to immigrants that originate from countries with which they had previous linkages.\textsuperscript{21}

The social capital involved in the migration networks has two essential benefits: it provides access to the resources of other migrants\textsuperscript{22} and it also offers improved information for the potential migrants. This dimension illustrates the fact that the information benefits of a large existing community are higher than those of a small community.\textsuperscript{23}

In the light of the short analysis above, chain migration usually follows the following steps:

a) Migration processes only go beyond pioneer migration if the pioneer migrants succeed in acting as brokers, this meaning that they are successful in mobilizing resources (economic, human capital, reciprocity, solidarity). Solidarity that goes beyond kinship is necessary in order to create chain migration. It is only when transfer costs are reduced, a critical mass of migrants is stimulated and there is an ever-growing supply of potential migrants that the chain migration is enforced.\textsuperscript{24}

b) If the migrant networks already exist, the migration process is self-perpetuating, because every act of further migration strengthens the ties that have been already formed,

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Thomas Faist. \textit{The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces}. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 104-123.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
which has been called “cumulative mobility”\textsuperscript{25}. It often happens that the migrants know who awaits them and who is going to offer them a job in the host country because of the chain network already established. \textsuperscript{26}

c) Despite its cumulative effects, at some point in time, the migration level tends to stagnate or decrease. Some of the factors that contribute to this effect are wage equalization between the host and the sending country or the reduction of the stock of citizens that are willing to immigrate, in the sending country. Furthermore, the countries that experience immigration are likely to impose restrictions that affect the incoming flow of immigrants.

The immigration patterns in general, and chain migration networks in particular, are greatly influenced by the 	extit{restrictive immigration policies} that some host states adopt. The immigration states have adopted both restrictive and extensive policies to deal with the level of immigration. These measures had the role of shaping political conflicts over welfare state provisions, national security, and also the fear of being economically and culturally overwhelmed by the immigrants.\textsuperscript{27} The conflicts lead to a significant increase in the level of politicization in some host states, and, in this manner, they contribute to the restrictive policies towards the immigrants. This is the reason why it is always important to look at the \textit{discourse} that surrounds the issue of immigration in the host states, but also at the \textit{interaction between political parties and interest groups}. Although the problems that are brought forward in the discourse of the above mentioned groups may have other roots, they often hold immigration as responsible, as a “meta-issue”: \textsuperscript{28} These actors tend to explain economic and social problems by

referring to immigrants, most of the time without having to bring forward concrete or real evidence, because the levels of migration are extremely hard to establish. Of course, some threats exist in the immigration country, but most of the time, the “meta-issue” of immigration gains much more significance than it has. The standard argument against immigration, especially labour migration, is that immigrants will compete with natives for jobs, housing and social services.

The short analysis above served as a theoretical framework for the next subchapters, which analyze Polish migration to the UK and Romanian migration to Italy. The formation of chain migration will help me explain why Polish immigration to the UK was to be expected after 2004, while it should be improbable that a significant number of Romanians would opt for the UK even without restrictions. The theoretical approach will also be helpful in showing that the Romanians have already established a strong “migratory chain” with Italy, and it would prove hard to break this chain and choose other destinations in the near future, considering the high percentage of Romanian workers preferring Italy as their destination at the end of 2006.

2.2 “Migratory Chains” in the United Kingdom and Italy

The “migratory chain” theory can explain the massive inflow of Polish workers to the UK in 2004. One has to consider that the Polish were not a group that suddenly decided to come to a country that opened its borders, without considering the costs and benefits of their migration. If we look at UK-Polish history and at the numbers of Polish people already living, working, or being granted British citizenship before 2004, the situation becomes clearer.

The same “migratory chain” theory would dismiss the fears promoted by the British media and the leading think tanks in the UK regarding the inflow of Romanian workers to the UK.
According to the chain migration approach, if there is not a strong existent community already in the host country the costs for migration become too high.\textsuperscript{29} Consequently, if we look at the numbers of Romanians and Bulgarians in the UK, one has to question the predictions made by the British statisticians.

\begin{flushright}
2.2.1 Polish Immigration to the UK: History and Expectations
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The massive Polish immigration to the UK is not a new thing, as many voices try to show after 2004. It has a tradition deeply rooted in history that started in the aftermath of World War 2, with the massive number of refugees that came to the UK. From the end of the Second World War until 2004 there was a significant movement of people migrating from Poland to Britain, first as a result of wartime displacement and deportation, then during the Cold War despite heavy restrictions, and later again, post-socialist economic migration away from the economic uncertainty of a 'transitioning' country.\textsuperscript{30}

Poland was one of the critical factors in bringing Britain into the WW2 and Poles fought alongside her forces during the conflict. Between 1947 and 1951, there were approximately 210,000 Polish people who settled in the United Kingdom, forced by the delicate political situation.\textsuperscript{31} Polish refugees included the ones who were directly affected by the Nazi invasion and the Polish Servicemen who left France, which was also under Nazi occupation. Refugees resettled from camps in the British zone of post-war Germany. The Polish refugees were then integrated into the United Kingdom and were supported by the government to find both employment and accommodation with not so much difficulty, partly because of the entitlements that they received.

\textsuperscript{29} Thomas Faist. \textit{The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces}. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 300-309.
\textsuperscript{31} Kathy Burrel. \textit{War, Cold War and New World Order: Political Boundaries and Polish Migration to Britain}. De Montfort University, History in Focus: Migration. Available at: http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Migration/articles/burrell.html.
through the 1947 Polish Resettlement Act and to the importance given to employment by the Polish Resettlement Corps (PRC).\textsuperscript{32} Through the PRC, the Polish soldiers in Britain were discharged from the Polish armed forces. Furthermore, their wives and dependent relatives were brought to Britain to join them, a factor that explains the huge inflow (the above mentioned 210,000). The Polish Government in Exile remained in London until 1990 in order to oppose the Communist aggressor, a fact that is illustrative for the strong ties that exist between the two nations.

Although the number of Poles in the UK decreased gradually, the number was still high after the Cold War (approximately 110,000).\textsuperscript{33} By the 1960s, Poles were seen as “good workers, solid citizens and family men”\textsuperscript{34} in the British community. The links between the Polish Community in UK and their home country experienced the most difficult period between 1981 and 1983 (Martial Law)\textsuperscript{35}, but also until 1989 (the fall of the Communist regime), because of the restrictions on movement from Poland. But even in these conditions, emigration from Poland to the UK continued, as can be seen in the tables 2.2.1A and 2.2.1B (Appendix 2). The Poles were the most numerous from Eastern Europe that were granted British citizenship in the period 1980-1989. The post-communist period again encouraged immigration from Poland. Between 1990 and 2004, numbers were still the highest for the Poles, with only the people from the Russian Federation being more numerous in terms of obtaining British citizenship from 2001. The 2004 wave was one to be expected, considering the links that were already established in the last 70 years of common history and migratory flows.

\textsuperscript{32} Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK. “The History of Resettlement in the United Kingdom”. http://www.icar.org.uk/?lid=95. Further information can also be found on the website of the UK National Archives: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/familyhistory/guide/migrantancestors/polish.htm.

\textsuperscript{33} Keith Sword \textit{Identity in Flux: The Polish Community in Britain}, London 1996, p.40-50


The 2001 Census shows that the Polish population in the UK represented approximately 25% of the total Eastern Europeans in the country (Table 2.2.1C. Appendix 2).

Going back to the “chain migration” approach, it is clear that the pioneer Polish immigration to the UK happened in the aftermath of World War II. It involved a very significant number of people and their dependents. The pioneer migration gave birth to a strong Polish community and to the brokers that were needed in order to encourage further immigration to the UK. The migratory network was self-perpetuating, although it experienced difficult periods during the Communist period. The migratory chain was further encouraged by the end of Communism, but most specifically by the EU accession, which simplified the legal status of the Polish people in the UK. In this case, the host country encouraged the migratory chain by an extensive policy, specifically by being one of the three old member states that opened its labour market in 2004.

2.2.2 Romanian Emigration to Italy: the Post-Communist Flow

The history of Romanian immigration to Italy is relatively short, beginning with the post-communist era, but has developed in an extraordinary way. Due to the fact that it is a relative recent phenomenon, it is specifically identified as labour migration. All the elements of the “chain migration” theory are present in the pattern of Romanian workers going to Italy. The statistics and the charts below are illustrative for the fact that Italy is the preferred destination for the Romanian willing to work abroad.

The Pioneers went to Italy starting with 1990, immediately after the collapse of the Communist regime. As can be observed from Table 2.2.2A (Appendix 3), Italy became one of the

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main destinations for Romanian workers in the second half of the 90’s. Between 1995 and 2002 (the second migratory phase), Italy was among the preferred destinations, next to Israel, Turkey, Hungary, Canada and Spain. Starting from 2002, after the period of exploration, there is a very sharp increase in the number of Romanians going to Italy.\textsuperscript{37} In 2004 there are already 244,377 Romanian with permits of stay in Italy, while in 1998 there were only 24,796. (Table 2.2.A, Appendix 3).

Although the numbers estimated by OECD in December 2005 (Table 2.2.2B, 2.2.2C, Appendix 3) are smaller than those put forward by the Italian Ministry of Interior, Romanian workers (191,000) are leading as foreign workforce in Italy, surpassing the Moroccans (156,000) and Albanians (139,000).

It is important to follow the dramatic increase of the number of Romanians in Italy between 1997 and 2004 (Table 2.2.2D, Appendix 3) in order to understand that the migratory networks were put in place and proved to be functioning extremely well in this period. An illustrative fact is also the transformation of the rural areas in Romania, from where most of the workers that chose Italy depart. There are entire villages from where the male population is almost absent, or even more, from where the young population is absent.\textsuperscript{38} As a result of the networks and of the remittances sent home by the Romanian workers in Italy there has also been an extraordinary transformation of some rural areas, especially in the region of Moldavia, the eastern region of Romania.\textsuperscript{39}

According to a 2005 study undertaken by the Romanian National Association of Citizens’ Advice Bureau, the preference of Romanian workers towards EU member states is the following:

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Florentina Constantin. \textit{Migrating or Commuting? The Case of Romanian Workers in Italy: Niches for Labor Commuting to the EU}. \url{http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2004/migration/pt1/commuting}.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
Italy (29.51%), Spain (22.40%), Germany (13.57%), Hungary (5.80%), France (5.53%), Great Britain (4.61%), Austria (4.48%), Portugal (1.98%), Ireland (1.32%). ⁴⁰

Italy is also leading in a 2006 study released by the Open Society Foundation in December 2006⁴¹, only one month before Romania’s EU accession. According to the same OSF study, published in December 2006, the most common way of getting a job in Italy is through „friends and relatives”, meaning that the migratory chain framework is valid for the Romanian workers going to Italy.

By looking at the estimates and the preferences of Romanian workers in 2006 (Table 2.2.E, Appendix 3), just several months before the EU accession, it can be concluded that there is not a strong preference for the UK as a work destination. The majority of Romanians who are willing to work abroad are still attracted by Italy, where there is already a significant community.

Summary

The short analysis above attempted to illustrate, using the “chain migration” framework, that there were strong linkages between Poland and the UK regarding the inflow of people even before the 2004 accession moment. This can explain in part the massive migration that happened in the last three years. As the “migratory chain” approach presupposes, the migratory linkages between countries can go from strong to weak. The Polish migration to the UK can be characterized by “strong”, just as the Romanian migration to Italy. However, the fears promoted by the UK in relation to the Romanian work migration are not sustained either by the “chain migration” approach or statistics. By looking at these tendencies, it is interesting to see why Italy

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chose to be more open to Romanian workers after the most recent enlargement, although the numbers show a great predilection of Romanians towards this particular country.
3. Managing Migration: Two Different Stories

It is important to look into the UK and Italy’s labour migration policies adopted over time, as well as into their strategies for foreign employment in order to find a possible explanation for the kind of restrictions that they adopted in 2004 and 2007. I argue that, in the light of their past immigration policies, the measures that they imposed in 2004 were not in line with their actual domestic strategies used until that moment. This is clear when we look at the Work Permit Scheme adopted by the UK in February 2005, only several months after granting free access to the workers from the A8. Italy, on the other hand, was one of the first EU15 countries to abandon the restrictive policies toward the A8 nationals. The policies adopted in 2007 are more illustrative for the goals that Italy and the UK expect to attain concerning their labour market.

3.1 Italy’s Labour Migration Policy

Priority: Low and Medium Skilled Foreign Workforce

Like other Mediterranean countries, Italy has been mainly an emigrant country, sending millions of people abroad. Starting with 1973, this pattern changed and Italy started to receive foreign workers.\(^{42}\) Between 1986 and 2003, the foreign population with a legal resident status increased from 290 000 to approximately 2.2 million (Table 3.1A, appendix 4).\(^{43}\)

Since the mid 1980’s, the employer-driven selection of foreign workforce has been recognized legislatively in Italy. The first law that attempted to regulate the entry of foreign workers into Italy was issued in 1986 (Law 943/1986)\(^{44}\) and it involved a needs test for hiring.

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Another law (39/1990 or the Martelli Law) was issued in 1990\textsuperscript{45}, as a consequence of the significant rise in migration, and it was the first to bring in the notion of quotas. In 1996, the centre-left government came to power and passed a new immigration law (Law 40/1996 or Testo Unico, actually passed in 1998), through which the three-pillar immigration policy was adopted. This law was also supported by the centre-right coalition and included the fight against illegal immigration (first pillar), regulating legal migration (second pillar) and the integration of resident foreigners (third pillar). The fight against illegality was to be done by bilateral agreements, the regulation of legal migrants through the quota system and the integration of foreigners through the national immigration funds which were distributed to the regions. Migrant workers were allowed to enter the country within the established quotas, having a job offer or a sponsorship from a legal Italian resident.\textsuperscript{46} Law 286/1998 asked the Government to consider the indicators provided by the Ministry of Labour (qualifications, unemployment levels, non-EU workers on employment lists).

A more recent law (189/2002) added to the previous one the requirement to observe the request for the foreign workforce according to the needs of the Italian regions. These regions could inform the Government about their predictions about the absorption capacity of their labour markets.\textsuperscript{47}

The decision making process regarding the stock of foreign labour that is needed involves not only the government (Ministry of Labour), but also social partners (employers’ associations, trade unions), which are able to make requests that are based on their estimates about the demand for a foreign workforce.\textsuperscript{48} The local and the regional labour offices of the Ministry of Labour provide the estimated shortages only after consulting with the local representatives of the social parties. The employers’ association frequently lobby, all the important ones have a representative, 

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{48} Strozza Golini and Cibella Basili. “L’immigrazione straniera: La situazione in Italia e alcuni elementi per il Piemonte e Torino”, 2004. Available at: \\
\url{www.piemoteimmigrazione.it/PDF/integrometro_completo.pdf}.
\end{flushright}
a specialist in immigration issues, who lobbies with the policy makers and the general public, promoting special interests.49

The demographic decline and the low fertility rate in the country has been a factor that determined the country’s need for a foreign workforce. While the government has often responded to the increase of the foreign population by imposing restrictive legislation, Italy has the highest level of regularization programs for its migrants. As the table shows, between 1986 and 2002, the country legalized over 1.5 million migrants out of a total population of 57 million (Table 3.2B, Appendix 4).50 Only the US has regularized a higher number of immigrants than Italy.

It has been argued that labour immigration in Italy has been more service-oriented than in other European countries, with domestic and caring work specifically prominent. Also, constructions and agriculture represented, and still do, a common field of work for foreigners.51 A look at the level of unemployment could explain why Italy is more interested in attracting low or medium skilled workers. Labour shortages in Italy are not specifically concerned with highly qualified jobs. As Reyneri observes, the reason is not an oversupply of highly educated labour force, but rather the fact that the Italian economic system provides much less highly qualified jobs than the number of highly educated people that the educational system produces.52 In 1999, 2.3% of the highest qualified Italian citizens were living abroad, while the level was only 1% in France, Germany, Spain and the UK.53 The most significant number of foreign workers in Italy was employed in low and medium-skilled sectors, and a high percent of those hired had no prior experience (Table 3.2C, appendix 4).

49 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
The recent labour supply shortages, as indicated in the table above, are still the highest in the fields requiring low-skilled workers. Supply shortages are also felt in some specialized areas, such as construction, metal industry, industry and services. Alongside the fields indicated above, agriculture is also very important. Despite the fact that the social contributions indicate that as few as 10% of the workers in agriculture are foreigners, the ones that work in this sector say that almost all the new workforce hired is represented by foreigners. Table 3.2D (Appendix 4) illustrates that Italy is not primarily interested in attracting foreign workforce for the executive and high skilled positions in general.

The Italian quota system considers the annual labour requirements, not the demographic elements. The labour need is expressed by the employers through a survey (Excelsior), which is conducted jointly by the Ministry of Labour and the Chambers of Commerce, then evaluated by the government figures. Through this survey, the sectors and the skills most sought are identified. Most of the workers that are hired after this survey do not have experience and are usually trained by the employer. The Excelsior survey often identifies a significantly greater shortage of labour than the quotas that are introduced by the Italian Ministry of Labour. Excelsior is considered to provide the most accurate estimations of the labour needs outside the domestic and the agricultural sectors, because the Italian employment agencies find it hard to identify the local labour market shortages and to evaluate the skills of foreign workers. No points system is used in Italy, although there were some discussions about Italian language requirements. During the sponsor system, the visas for the people seeking jobs were issued on the basis “first come first served”, not on the basis of the characteristics of the applicant.

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
The companies that ask for foreign labour plan their human resource need considering the region where their workforce comes from. In Italy, the idea that foreign workers are competing with Italians is not present as in other countries. The surveys which started around the mid 1990’s revealed a declining perception among the Italian citizens that there is a competition for jobs between them and the foreign workers. At present, only a minority of Italians think that migrant workers steal their jobs.\(^58\) The idea which is implemented through the Excelsior system is that the jobs that the foreigners take are the jobs that the Italians do not want.

The trends in Italian policy towards immigration are going in the direction of increasing the authorized entries of migrant workers and at improving the settlement of a permanent immigration. The reason can be found in the constant decline of unemployment (from 2.5 million in 1995 to 1.7 million in 2006)\(^59\), the rising unqualified labour shortages, in particular in the Centre-Northern regions, and the change in government, from the centre-right to centre-left government. The new government already made an important step in this direction by accepting, at the end of 2006, all the applications that surpassed the yearly quota set by the former government.\(^60\)

The 2004 approach to labour migration was more of an effort to show European solidarity with the other EU-15 member states (other 11 members have imposed the restrictions), and part of the effort to show to the EU that Italy was taking measures to improve its border control and was on the right path when dealing with illegality.\(^61\) In December 2006, prior to the announcement of some restrictions for the A2, Italian officials said that they would wait for the reaction of the other EU countries before taking a decision in this direction. However, Italy has already dropped all the transitional arrangements towards the A8 and has announced a more open


\(^{60}\) Ibid.

policy towards the A2. As of January 1st, 2007, free circulation was granted to Romanians and Bulgarians for all the jobs needed in particular by the Italian labour market: housekeepers, caregivers, construction workers, metalworkers, seasonal workers in tourism and agriculture. As Emilio Reyneri observes, “the last choice did matter, because for some years Romanians are the largest group of migrants living in Italy”.  

In April 2007, the trend of encouraging labour migration was made even clearer by the new centre-left government, which proposed a revision of the legislation that concerns foreign workers, characterized by a more open vision on labour migration. The most illustrative elements of this bill are the following:

- The quotas regarding the number of foreign workers are to be established on a triennial basis. However, depending on the data concerning the labour needs, which is to be collected by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the quotas can be revised yearly. Informally, sources from the Minister mentioned a quota of 200 000 foreign workers, which is significantly higher than the ones adopted in the past.

- It has been proposed that the domestic workers (housekeepers and caregivers) should be excluded from the quota system, in which they are included now.

- The duration of the work permits is to be extended both for the foreigners that are already working and for the ones that are still looking for a job.

- The personal and professional details of the potential work migrants are to be put on lists in the sending countries and distributed on the internet to the Italian employers.

- The sponsored entry for job seeking is to be reintroduced. The sponsors can be: employers’ associations, local bodies, trade unions, Italian or foreign citizens or even the work migrants themselves if they have the sufficient financial resources.

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63 Information offered by the International Organization for Migration.
64 Information offered by the International Organization for Migration.
The short analysis above shows that Italy has tended to be less restrictive towards low and medium-skilled foreign workforce and that the vision of the new centre-left government is in line with encouraging further economic migration in Italy, especially in the aforementioned sectors. Taking this into consideration, it can be argued that Italy is unlikely to change the labour immigration system that has emerged during the last 20 years. The fact that Italy decided to stop all the work restrictions for the A8 after the first deadline and to open important sectors of its labour market for the A2 in 2007, is illustrative. The labour shortages felt by the employers will remain the central element for the Italian labour policy, in many cases this being more important than the officially established quotas.

3.2. United Kingdom’s Immigration Policy:

**Priority: Highly Skilled Foreign Workforce**

Great Britain has been called “Europe’s would be zero immigration country” for a series of reasons that concern the origins and the development of its immigration policy. This is mainly due to the transformation of the country from a global colonial to a regional European power. Legislation related to immigration in Britain has not been entirely based on the economic needs of the country, but mostly on three main assumptions: that the state is the one who has the absolute control over the immigration issues, that the UK is a small country that cannot afford to receive a large number of immigrants, and that particular categories of immigrants are more desirable than others.

Between 1948 and 1962 Britain had an open migration regime. The British Nationality Act (1948) granted the right to move to Britain to all the subjects of the Crown, meaning the people

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66 Lynnette Kelly. Migration Policy in the UK, Warwick University. Available at: [http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol_UK.pdf](http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol_UK.pdf).
from the colonies and the Commonwealth. However, what started initially as a movement of individuals turned into chain migration and the families started to join the ones that arrived earlier. (Table 3.2E, Appendix 5) shows the gradual increase in immigration from the New Commonwealth, followed by the decrease brought about by the 1961 Immigration Act.

Starting with the “race riots” (1958), the issue of immigration became highly politicized and the government began to react to what was considered to become a problem, namely the large number of immigrants. The Immigration Act (1961) attempted to restrict immigration from the Commonwealth but instead encouraged the migratory chain. The ones who already had relatives there where granted easier access because of the “sponsor” requirement. Another Commonwealth Immigration Act was passed in 1968, which introduced entry controls for the ones who held British passports, but did not have a close connection to Britain, with the intention to reduce the numbers of Asians from East Africa. However, because a significant number of East African Asians did not have an alternative regarding their destination, the British government was forced to let in the ones that it wanted to keep out.

The Act introduced in 1971 brought in the total governmental control over the immigration issues. The vouchers that were previously used for employment were replaced by work permits, which did not grant permanent residence or the entry of dependants. The citizens of the Commonwealth made no exception from this rule, but only the ones who could prove that they were “patrials” (having strong British roots through descent or birth). Although it was a restrictive law, it allowed the far right to claim that immigration was a top issue for the UK and in

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68 Ibid.
69 Lynnette Kelly. *Migration Policy in the UK*, Warwick University. Available at: [http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol_UK.pdf](http://www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj32_1pdf/MigPol/MigPol_UK.pdf).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
this matter the idea that immigrants are a problem was perpetuated. The 1981 Act significantly restricted the entry of dependants and by the early 1990’s the primary immigration to the United Kingdom was reduced.

The work permit system, which was introduced in the 70’s suffered a series of transformations and reforms, but the main focus of the immigration policies remained the restrictive actions. The migrant labour to the United Kingdom is generally characterized through a controlled work permit system, in which the employers have to identify a certain person to do a particular job. Local workers are protected through the work permit system because the employer has to show that there are no available residents to fill the job for which the migrant worker is employed. The only categories that do not require a permit are business people, self-employed people and the investors. The entry of low-skilled workers has been limited almost completely, with the only possible routes being the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), which allows the entry of migrants for a period of six months or the Commonwealth Working Holidaymakers Scheme, which gave permits of stay for two years.

In 1997, the New Labour government that came to power expressed the need for a more “managed” way of dealing with immigration issues. The two tier work system evolved and new schemes have been introduced. The government considered that by adding new programmes, there would be an increase in the national skills base and a reduction of illegal work in the country. High-skilled workers were the ones advantaged by the arrangement of the schemes.

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74 Ibid.
Currently, the work permit structure encompasses the following:75

a) The main scheme, which includes work permits, first permissions and the Training and Work Experience Scheme (TWES).

b) The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and the Sector-Based Scheme (SBS). The SAWS was founded after WW2 and is aimed at meeting the shortage of seasonal and agricultural workers. The SBS was initiated in 2003 for the food processing and hospitality sectors, with a quota of 10 000 each. Both SAWS and SBS are for very limited periods (from 5 weeks to 6 month for SAWS and up to 12 months for SBS). In case of re-application, the foreign workers have to wait several months outside the UK before they are again eligible. There are also strict eligibility conditions (for SAWS only people over 18 and in full-time education and for SBS only 18-30 years old).

c) The Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) was launched in 2002, with the aim of attracting individuals with exceptional skills. The initial period for which is granted residence is one year, but there is the expectation of permission for another three years, followed by the right of settlement. The workers under this scheme can bring dependants. Although it started as a pilot scheme, the HSMP has become permanent.

There were 15 200 permits issued in 2001 and 25 000 in 2003 under the SAWS scheme,76 but the number was greatly reduced (with 35%, from 25 000 to 16 250) after the 2004 EU enlargement, because the workers coming from the new member states did not require permits anymore.


The HSMP which was implemented in 2002 has not been a very successful program. There were only 8451 successful applications between early 2002 and late 2003, with the main four occupational groups being: finance, business managers, information technologists and medical services.\textsuperscript{77} The small number of applications had little impact on the UK labour market.\textsuperscript{78} The HSMP shows UK’s attitude towards skill acquisition by its deliberate policy of encouraging high skilled migrants to come to the country. (Table 3.2F, Appendix 5) shows that there were significantly more work permits issued for high-skilled foreign workers than for low or medium-skilled (1995, 2000-2002).

A comparative distribution by sectors between local and migrant workers is also illustrative for the UK preferences in relation to foreign workforce recruitment. The level of migrant employment in public administration, education, health, banking, finance and insurance is higher than the level of local employment in 2005 (3.2G, Appendix 5).\textsuperscript{79}

The UK did not place restrictions on the number of migrant workers from the countries that entered the EU in 2004. However, it does require their registration when they take up employment (Worker Registration Scheme, introduced in February 2005) and the A8 nationals have restricted access to benefits.\textsuperscript{80} Those who register are given a certificate that is issued for 12 months and confirms that they are allowed to live in the UK while they are working in that particular job. In case the A8 nationals change jobs before the 12 months deadline, they are obliged to renew the certificate. It is compulsory for their employers to verify if the worker has registered because it is against the law to employ an A8 national who did not obtain a Worker Registration Certificate.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Actually, all the EU25 nationals who have been in the UK for a while and wish to claim benefits have to pass the “habitual residence” test. The A8 nationals have to pass an extra test called “a right to reside”.

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Registration Scheme certificate. Consequently, it can be argued that the UK did not adopt a complete freedom of movement policy towards the A8 nationals.

UK’s preference for high skilled foreign labour is also illustrated by the new Points Based System (PBS), which is to come into force in 2008. According to the PBS, foreign workers are given points depending on how much they can “benefit the UK” and they are separated in 5 tiers, according to which they are entitled to particular rights and period of stay.\footnote{The information regarding the PBS is taken from the Home Office Official web page at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/points-based-system.} Most work migrants that will be incorporated in this scheme will need a sponsor, which can be business related or academic institution, in order to obtain the work permit. The tiers are organized as follows:\footnote{Ibid.}:

a) **First Tier**: Highly Skilled Migrants, which are allowed to bring dependants and are granted settlement in the UK after a 2 year testing. They are the only group pf migrants who are not obliged to have a sponsor.

b) **Second Tier**: Skilled Workers with a job offer. This tier allows for the recruitment of foreign workers for the domains in which there is a labour shortage, and, most importantly after proving that the migrant will not displace a UK or a EU worker (except Romania and Bulgaria until the end of transitional arrangements). The employer in the UK has to show that the salary will be competitive and that it will not produce a decrease in the average salary for that particular job. The foreign workers are allowed to bring dependants and settle only after a period of 5 years. They have the possibility to change employers and move to Tier 1, but only after a reassessment conducted by the Home Office.

c) **The Third Tier** is concerned with low skilled migration. These migrants are to suffer the most restrictions. In the words of the Immigration Minister, Liam Byrne, the goal is to
“phase out the schemes for low-skilled migration from outside the EU”\textsuperscript{83}. Only after being unable to identify low-skilled EU labour for shortages the foreign recruitment will take place, only from countries that agree to sign the returns arrangement with the United Kingdom. The low-skilled workers will only be allowed to stay in the UK for a period of maximum a year, without the right to bring dependants and without the possibility to move to another tier.

\textbf{d) The Fourth Tier} refers to students, for which the working regulations remain unchanged.

\textbf{e) The Fifth Tier} includes temporary workers and youth mobility, which are supposed to “satisfy non-economic objectives”\textsuperscript{84}. They can stay in the UK for maximum 2 years without the possibility of changing tiers. Countries will be rated in order to classify them according to their immigration risks.

The Points are given according to: qualifications (there is a bonus if workers have a degree obtained in the UK), previous salary (which is to be compared to the UK’s economy), work history, age, and knowledge of English (which is compulsory for tiers 1 and 2). The control factors include the Certificate of Sponsorship, the worker’s funds and the history of observance with the migration controls. The Home Office declared that this new system’s logic is that “employers should look first to recruit from the UK and this expanded EU before recruiting migrants from outside”.\textsuperscript{85} However, this procedure will also be used for the Romanian and Bulgarian workers until the transitional arrangements are lifted.

In contrast to countries like Italy or Spain, the United Kingdom has had a reduced experience with the regularization programmes and the number of people that were regularized is

\textsuperscript{83} The Independent (London). “Home Office limits visas for workers from outside Europe”, by Ben Russel, October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2006. Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20061020/ai_n16805879.


\textsuperscript{85} The Independent (London). “Home Office limits visas for workers from outside Europe”, by Ben Russel, October 20\textsuperscript{th}, 2006. Available at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20061020/ai_n16805879.
insignificant (1,809 people between during the first program in 1971, another 462 people in 1977).\textsuperscript{86} Between 1988 and 1999, the UK government introduced the Overseas Domestic Workers Concession. However, because the requirements were two harsh (admitted in the UK before July 1988, valid passport, proof of current employment and of the ability to support oneself), by 1999 less than 200 immigrants regularized their status.\textsuperscript{87}

Although there were debates surrounding the issues of regularization, the government has been constantly reticent in applying the amnesty programmes on a large scale. The policy has been inclined towards the regularization of the immigrants on an individual case method, through small scale programmes.\textsuperscript{88} Rather than regularization programmes to manage irregular work, the UK has adopted the employer sanctions through the \textit{Asylum and Immigration Act} (1996). This act made it illegal to “knowingly or negligently employ people who do not have permission to work in the UK”.\textsuperscript{89} In November 2003, the Home Secretary announced that he wanted to “provide a way out” for the illegal immigrants. However, he dismissed a general employment concession, saying that what he had in mind was an “earned regularization”.\textsuperscript{90} The criteria used for a possible regularization would include the length of time spent in the UK, the kind of economic contribution made to the UK and whether there had been attempts to take advantage of the UK welfare system in an illegal manner.\textsuperscript{91} As it can be observed, the requirements are not going to encourage a significant number of illegal work migrants to apply for regularization programmes.

The decision-making process in the UK does not involve the social actors to the same degree as in Italy. The decisions regarding the quotas are usually established independently by the

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
government, while the employers’ associations and the trade unions have only a consultative role. The social actors regard the reforms as minimalist and not effective in bringing a major adaptation of migration policy that would actually meet the level of labour demand in the UK. The argument is usually that the actual policies do not open important new channels for legal economic migration, and that the low and medium skilled labour migration is limited to the two migration schemes that have no family reunification rights and the expectation to return in a maximum of 12 months. The Home Office wanted to integrate the social partners in decision making through the User Panel Process (organizations that are most influential) and the Consultation process (sending consultation documents to various stakeholders in order to get feedback for policy choices). Although a positive development in the direction of involving the stakeholders in the decision making process, the way in which the government rushed through the controversial legislation and the way it managed the feedback from the social partners proved that the balance of power remains with the political sphere and that there are serious limitations to the consultation systems.

The social partners seriously opposed the work restrictions that were imposed by the UK towards the nationals of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Brandon Barber, the Secretary General of the Trade Unions’ Congress, representing 66 organizations, with over 7 million employees in all sectors, criticized the decision to restrict the entry of Romanians and Bulgarians, calling it a “cheap political game”. The TUC representative declared that the problem is not represented by the A2 nationals, but the laws that regulate the UK labour market: “The solution is not imposing

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
restrictions, but amending the laws”.  

He also said that the work migrants contribute positively to the social security system, with the condition that they are paid at the same level with the British employees.

After analyzing the immigration policies adopted over time in the UK, especially starting with 1961, it can be inferred that the 2004 decision to open the labour market for the new member states was not in line with the actual needs and priorities of the UK labour market. The decision was most likely triggered by the effort of the UK officials to prove that the country was committed to EU principles of freedom of movement. This was seen as a necessity especially after the UK opted out of Schengen and the Euro zone. Pat Cox, President of the European parliament, called on the British government to show a lead in the debate about Enlargement:

“We are challenged, as politicians who believe in the benefits of a reunited Europe, to seize this moment, to give leadership and bring the vision necessary to win … public consent. It is greatly to be regretted that - at a moment of such historic significance for Europe - so much of the debate has been reduced to accountancy and mere hype, speculation and unsubstantiated claims about migration.”

However, Tony Blair showed skepticism when he declared that there was a "potential risk" of an influx from new EU states. He said the government was examining rules governing the eligibility to benefits of new migrant workers. Although the UK accepted to open its labour market in May 2004, the British government began to reverse its open-door policy starting with February 2005, with the introduction of the Worker Registration Scheme for the A8 workers.

The UK’s labour migration policies are most likely to go in the same restrictive direction as before. This expectation was also strengthened by the official declarations prior to the 2007 enlargement, when Home Secretary John Reid stated that “mass immigration is the ‘greatest

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
challenge' facing European governments at present” and that “managed migration could bring essential, skilled, workers to Britain”\textsuperscript{100}.

Summary

Italy and the UK have two different ways of managing migration, illustrating that the two countries have different priorities when it comes to foreign labour migration. Italy, emerging as a recent immigration country and with an expanding economy, has promoted a need for low or medium-skilled workforce. This is illustrated by the structure of the entry quotas and also by the decision-making system, which takes into consideration the needs of the social partners. Their most recent policies also show openness for the same type of foreign workers. The UK is a country with an older immigration tradition, especially from the Commonwealth countries but also from Eastern and Western Europe. Starting with 1961, the UK’s immigration policies have shown a clear restrictive direction for the foreign workforce. The work permit system and the clear preference for the highly skilled and skilled migrants are elements that confirm the restrictive attitude towards the low skilled work. The most recent Points Based System shows that the UK’s policies are not going to change any time soon.

In the light of these arguments, I argue that after the 2004 enlargement, neither of the two countries adopted the policies that were in line with their foreign work management. However, in 2007, both Italy and the United Kingdom showed their preferences in a clear manner, one by lifting the work restrictions and the other one by imposing them.

4. Public and Political Attitudes in Italy and United Kingdom: What is Different?

The “chain migration” approach states that immigration is transformed in a “meta-issue” whenever host countries are subject to migratory pressure. In this chapter I shall look at the Italian and British public and political attitudes regarding immigration to see how this “meta-issue” was discussed and treated in the two countries. The most interesting differences that could explain their contrasting decisions in 2007 are the following:

- Although the media was/is attacking immigration in both countries, in Italy the impact was and still is measured more in terms of illegality/criminality, while in the UK the most debated issues concern the economic impact (welfare/jobs) of labour migrants on the host society.

- In the UK, the discourse of the major immigration think-tanks (MigrationWatch, IPPR) have a significant media coverage, while in Italy the most important organizations of this type (FIERI, ISMU) have a very reduced presence in the media and do not adopt an anti-immigration stance.

- In the UK there has been a gradual convergence of the Labour and Conservative parties’ discourse on the importance of a “managed migration”. In Italy, the centre-right put more emphasis on restrictions than the centre left. The more openness on the Italian part can be partly explained by the change in government in 2006, although not even the centre-right’s restrictive policies proved to be coherent and effective (the regularization programmes).
While there has been political dialogue between the Italian and Romanian officials regarding labour migration, there were no such meetings or debates between the UK officials and the ones representing the A2.

4.1 Italy: Illegality Comes First

Just as the Eurobarometers before the 2004 accession (Autumn 2003, Spring 2004) the Eurobarometer for Italy in April and October 2006 does not include immigration as one of the basic concerns of the Italian public. The first places are occupied by the concern with unemployment (32% in June and 33 in October 2006), and with poverty and the economic situation. 69% of the Italian public agrees that the best way to deal with the challenges of immigration is represented by joint actions of the European Union member states, not solely by domestic policies. The majority of the citizens interviewed stated that EU membership is a good thing for their country, although there was a slight decrease during June and October 2006 (56% in June, 52% in October). Italians were among the countries that were most optimistic about EU membership also in 2003 and 2004.

A large part of the public opinion in Italy is influenced by the media (68% by the television and 50% by newspapers and periodicals), which focuses especially on criminality when it deals with the issue of immigration. However, the public discourse in Italy tends to present immigration more in terms of cultural and religious differences, than in economic terms.

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105 Eurobarometer for Italy (Spring 2006).
During the last 20 years, the Italian mass-media has shown the tendency to bring forward ‘alarmist’ information regarding immigrants, transforming them into ‘illegals’, ‘criminals’ and ‘threats’. The immigrants are often portrayed in the media as invading the country, and several studies conducted on the topic showed that immigrants make the news especially when they are involved in criminal episodes. The leading anti-immigration party, Lega Nord (Northern League), was responsible for a veritable storm in the media when saying that “The navy and the coastal guards should defend our coasts and use the cannon”.

However, the most controversial issues regarding immigrants are not economic, but mostly refer to religious and cultural stereotyping. Cardinal Giacomo Biffi made the news in September 2000, when he declared that Christians should be favoured over Muslims in populating the country, because “Muslims have different food, different tastes, different feast days, family law that is incompatible with ours and an idea of women that is very distant from ours”.

The Italian political debate over migrants was also not driven by economic criteria. As Emilio Reyneri observes, the discussion was mostly concerned with the unauthorized entries, not with the contribution of the migrant workers to the Italian economic system or the labour force decline. The politicians did not bring forward immigration in terms of costs or benefits for the economy, and this area has remained the focus of the academic field, without serious influence on public debate or the media coverage. The first data on the taxes and social contributions paid by

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109 Ibid.
110 Ancika Kosic and Anna Triandafyllidou. *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Italy*. Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, [www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe](http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe).
the migrant workers was only available very recently, as well as the fact that 20% of housing purchases in Italy were made by migrants in 2006.\footnote{Ibid.}

It is also interesting to see that the centre-right and the centre-left in Italy do not share the same vision when it comes to immigration issues. The 2004 decision to restrict and the 2006 decision to open important sectors can also be linked to the political discourse promoted by the centre-right and centre-left. Even in 2006 the political platform of the House of Freedoms (led by Berlusconi) included restrictions on immigration. Berlusconi’s political programme was also supported by the National Alliance and the Northern League, well-known for their populist and anti-immigration concerns. However, if one considers the significant number of migrants that regularized their status during Berlusconi’s term (approx. 700 000), it becomes clear that although the political discourse focused on the importance of restrictions, the policies were not coherent with it. The Union’s (centre-left, led by Romano Prodi) focus rested with moving police resources from immigration and escort issues to the control of territory and with the promotion of legal ways to immigrate to Italy. The bill introduced by the new centre-left government in April 2007 is illustrative of the fact that at the political level, due partly to the change from the centre-right to the centre-left government in 2006, labour migration to Italy will be encouraged in the next period.

The articles in the media concerning the negative portrayals of Romanians\footnote{Il Tempo, “Romanians- most violent and dangerous race”, October 2003 \url{http://english.hotnews.ro/Italian-newspaper-Romanians-most-violent-and-dangerous-race-articol_43505.htm}, also see Jessica ter Wall, “Quantitative analysis of daily press and TV in the EU member states”, Utrecht University, 2004. \url{http://www.multicultural.net/edmm/edmm_eureport.pdf}.} were overcome by discussions at the political level and by bilateral agreements regarding labour recruitment from Romania. Prior to EU enlargement in 2007, the Italian officials were interested in discussing their intent regarding the labour market and the Romanian workforce. The preoccupation with unauthorized migrants rather than the economic impact of foreign labour on the Italian economy was put forward by the discussions between the Romanian Prime Minister,
Calin Popescu Tariceanu and the Italian Minister of Interior, Giuliano Amato, before the 2007 EU enlargement, when the Italian party announced its intention to “sign, within the coming weeks, a treaty with Romania on strengthened co-operation in the field of combating organized crime”. He added: “There will be unrestrained free movement of workers only if this treaty works out well.”

The Italian political discourse towards Romanians tends to be optimistic in terms of labour migration to Italy, in comparison to the attitude of the UK officials.

> Today Romania is no longer of country of forced immigration for economic reasons. On the contrary, it is a country where in many places there is total employment. In some workplaces, the businesses which come from abroad are even forced to recruit foreign laborers because of the great economic boom of these last years.\(^{114}\)

Italian Deputy Prime-Minister Francesco Rutelli said after a meeting with the Romanian Prime-Minister, Calin Popescu Tariceanu, in November 2006. Rutelli also added that Italy’s labor migration policy will be in line with those of other EU countries, not as a matter of restricting access to Romanian workers, but for “regulating free circulation in a coordinated way with other European Union countries”.\(^{115}\) Although the majority of the EU-15 imposed restrictions on Romanian and Bulgaria, Italy has adopted an “open partially” approach which means that important sectors are not subject to restrictions for the new EU states. The discussions regarding labour migration from Romania to Italy continued in January 2007, when, during a meeting with the Romanian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi confirmed the fact that Italy does not fear a massive immigration from Romania after the EU enlargement:

> Immigration tends to fall once a country joins the EU, since it is thus concretely proven that the situation in the country of origin has improved. I firmly believe Romania is in such a situation and we are going to see a fall in the immigration in the future.\(^{116}\)

It is also worth mentioning that besides the optimism regarding the decreasing interest of Romanian workers in the Italian labour market, the Italian government is also not preoccupied


\(^{115}\) Ibid.

with estimating the number of new member states nationals that are going to ‘invade’ the country, in contrast to the UK case. The two parties also signed a bilateral agreement in October 2005, which regulates the migratory flux of Romanian workers towards Italy.\textsuperscript{117} The most important think-tanks that deal with immigration (FIERI, ISMU) have a reduced presence in the media and they do not adopt an anti-immigration stance when in come to EU enlargement.

Overall, the Italian case shows that both the media and the political discourse was and still is more focused on the notion of illegality and crime than on the economic impact of labour migration. Although the media promoted a negative image of Romanians, there was a strong political dialogue between Romania and Italy concerning the future inflow of workers, strengthened also by the winning of the elections by the Prodi centre-left government in 2006. The Eurobarometer for Italy shows that the citizens trust the EU more than in the UK; a joint action between the member states is seen as better than solely domestic measures for coping with the issues that immigration brings in the host country. All these elements combined can serve as a possible explanation why Italy chose to adopt a more open policy towards the A2 in 2007.

\textbf{4.2 United Kingdom: Economic Impact of Labour Migrants}

Between June and October 2006, the public support in the UK for the EU expansion dropped from 44\% to 36 and the percent of the ones who believed that EU membership was a good thing for the UK decreased from 42\% to 34\%.\textsuperscript{118} The Eurobarometer published April-June 2006 showed that in the UK the written press represented the source of information about EU integration for 42\% of the British population, although the most trusted sources remain the radio and television. By comparing the main areas of worry for the UK citizens in April-June 2006 with

\textsuperscript{117} Romanian Office for Labour Migration. \url{http://www.omfm.ro/w3c/detail.php?cat=3&scat=5&art=56}.

\textsuperscript{118} Eurobarometer for the United Kingdom (Spring and Fall). Available at: \url{http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_uk_nat.pdf} (Spring) and \url{http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_uk_exec.pdf} (Fall).
those in October 2006, it can be observed that immigration went up as the first concern, from 32% to 40% of the population.\textsuperscript{119} However, immigration was placed as one of the top-five concerns both in 2003 and 2004, showing that the EU enlargement just added a new dimension to these fears.\textsuperscript{120}

**Most important areas of concern for the UK citizens (Eurobarometer, Spring 2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Most important areas of concern for the UK citizens (Eurobarometer, Fall 2006)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The public discourse in the UK has been centred not only on criminality and negative clichés of certain nationalities, but also the economic and social impact of the foreign workers. Following the accession of the A8 countries, the main focus of the media and of the major think tanks was to assess the economic growth following the 2004 accession. The attitude of the government, which professed a ‘managed migration’\textsuperscript{121} illustrates that a major concern is represented by the way in which the inflow of foreign labour is regulated as to serve the UK economically and to address public anxieties. The ‘invaders’ are not necessarily the illegal migrants, but the ones that represent a threat to the jobs of the local population.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Eurobarometer UK Fall 2003 and Spring 2004.
The negative clichés of Romanians in the media are coupled with the efforts of the UK government and of major think-tanks of estimating how many new member states’ nationals are going to take advantage of their new status in the EU. The optimistic estimates, revealed by the government and the pro-immigration think tanks, indicate that approximately 41,000 Romanian and 15,000 Bulgarian workers are going to arrive in the UK only in 2007. However, the media revealed that the government, privately, fears a number between 60,000 and 140,000 workers from the two countries.\textsuperscript{122} MigrationWatch, one of the most influential anti-immigration think-tanks\textsuperscript{123}, very present in the British media, estimated 80,000 Bulgarians and 210,000 Romanians coming to the UK in the next 20 months following accession.\textsuperscript{124} The chairman of this anti-immigration organization, Sir Andrew Green, published his opinion about the most recent Enlargement:

\textit{Our new EU citizens from Romania and Bulgaria will have the right to come here for three months whether or not they intend to work. And if they are self-employed, then they are free to work from day one. It is not hard to imagine that at least some will arrive as visitors and stay on with whatever work they can find. For such people, there will be no effective sanction. Some may have no money to pay a fine and there is no room in our prisons if they don't. Nor can they be sent back to their home countries for minor offences. Even if they were, they could return on the next plane as our border controls are simply not good enough to detect them...the British people have been enormously tolerant but the strains are now beginning to show... The British Government, therefore, needs to take very great care. Signs of a tug of war between the Home Secretary and Number 10 suggest that ministers realise what is at stake...The imposition of work permits on Romanians and Bulgarians might have only limited effectiveness but the political message it sends would be far more important.}\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{122} The Times. “Migrant Fears in the UK”, by David Cracknell, July 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2007. \texttt{http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article691421.ece}. The article discusses a paper that has circulated in Whitehall. This document, from Joan Ryan, the Home Office minister, reveals deep concerns that a new wave of immigration might provoke a public backlash.

\textsuperscript{123} MigrationWatch was founded in 2001; it is well known for its anti-immigration position. It views the UK as overcrowded and sees immigration as making this problem worse. The group denies that immigration brings significant economic benefit to the UK and considers immigrants as a burden on the infrastructure of the country.


The anti-immigration articles signed by Sir Andrew Green have been published in the Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail (high circulation, over 750 000), The Independent, The Times, The Guardian (mid-circulation), The Scotsman, Yorkshire Post Today and BBC.

An observer of the British media cannot totally dismiss the relationship between the negative clichés of the new member states’ citizens and the British public opinion in relation to the recent enlargement. A media monitoring project, conducted between August 15\(^{th}\) and November 1\(^{st}\) 2006, reveals that at least one article dealing with EU enlargement in 2007 appeared every day (during this period) in the British media. Three major incidents shaped the portrayal of the most recent accession\(^{126}\): 1. The government’s release of the Accession Monitoring Report on August 22\(^{nd}\) 2006, when the number of immigrants from the A8 was revealed; 2. On September 25, when the EU gave the green light to Romanian and Bulgaria, guaranteeing their accession. 3. The British Government announcement on October 24\(^{th}\) of its intention to impose the transitional arrangements for the A2 citizens.\(^{127}\) (Chart 4.2C, Appendix 6).

The subjects dealt with in the articles were divided into 6 major categories: Immigration, Labour, Crime, Corruption, Public Resources and Cultural Impact. The ones that occupied the first positions were Immigration and Labour, with 45% and 44% of articles. This illustrates the main concerns regarding the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. An analysis of the articles published in the high-circulation media (The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph, The Sun, The Daily Express) and the medium-circulation media (The Financial Times, The Times, The Guardian, The Independent) show that the former category tended to adopt a more negative tone towards the effects of EU enlargement on labour migration to the UK. The Daily Express quoted a Romanian minister who said that “hundreds of thousands of Romanians are planning to go to Britain”\(^{128}\).


\(^{127}\) Ibid.

However, although the main concerns were related to the numbers and the social and economic impact of migrant, the articles dealt also with corruption, criminality and illegality from the A2 countries. The CISION\textsuperscript{129} analysis reveals that November 1\textsuperscript{st} was the day in which most of the articles dealing with this particular issue were published. It was the day in which most newspapers published a confidential governmental memo which expressed fear of the Romanian and Bulgarian “gangs” that would come to Britain after the enlargement. \textit{The Sun} published “Romanians Commit 85\% of Crime at Cash Points”, a story which was also put out by \textit{The Daily Mail}.\textsuperscript{130} Both quoted the MigrationWatch chairman, Sir Andrew Green who declared that he found “shocking evidence” of criminality in the Romanian community already settled in the UK.\textsuperscript{131}

Statistically, the CISION project found that the negative tone adopted by the high-circulation newspapers in relation to the most recent enlargement had detrimental consequences in terms of public perception. By using Net Effect\textsuperscript{132} values, the results were skewed negatively, illustrating that the overall impact was negative (Fig. 3.3.2, Appendix 6).

While in Italy the centre-right and the centre-left have diverging opinions about immigration, in the UK, the Labour government (centre-left) gradually came to agree with the Conservatives on this specific issue and even announced the implementation of the Points Based System, which was initially proposed in 2005 by the opposition as a way of managing the migratory inflow\textsuperscript{133}. While in 2005 the Labour Party stated that there is no “obvious upper

\textsuperscript{129} CISION is the largest member of AMEC (Association for Measurement and Evaluation of Communication), the global media research trade body. \url{http://uk.cision.com/about-cision/}.
\textsuperscript{132} An approximation of the readers who would recollect the issues reported in specific items of coverage and the way in which the issues would be recollected. \url{http://uk.cision.com/Documents/Whitepapers/British-medias-view-of-eu-expansion.pdf}.
level”

134 to immigration, in April 2007, Liam Byrne, the Labour Immigration minister said that “We have to accept that laissez faire migration risks damaging communities where parts of our anti-poverty strategy come under pressure”

135. Byrne also added that “it is ‘not racist’ to debate immigration”, although his party (Labour) heavily criticized the Conservatives for bringing this subject forward during the 2001 general election campaign. Although dismissing the fact that the new position of the government in relation to immigration was driven by the media and the anti-immigration campaigns, the Labour representative admitted that “the step-change in public concern about immigration has been one of the most dramatic aspects of the changing political agenda since Labour came to power”

136. Furthermore, Mr. Byrne stated in an article that immigration is now one of the most important concerns of British citizens if measures are not taken to properly manage it, the Labour party could risk losing power.

137

Aside from the negative impact of the media on public perception and the convergence of political discourse of the two main parties, the political dialogue between UK officials and A2 representatives following the 2007 enlargement was not present as in Italy and there are no bilateral agreements between them that refer to the labour inflow towards the United Kingdom.

138

Bringing together the importance given to the economic aspect of immigration, both at the political and public level, the negative clichés promoted by the British media and major think tanks, and the data from the Eurobarometer, it can be argued that public pressure represented a decisive factor in the British government’s decision to impose the transitional arrangements on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens.


136 Ibid.


Summary

The political and public discourse in the UK and Italy differs in several significant ways, which can explain their different approaches towards the transitional arrangements in 2007. Although the media promotes negative clichés of the new member states’ citizens in both countries, the major difference is that in Italy there is not so much interest in the economic impact of labour migrants, as in the UK. Another significant element is represented by the vision of the major political parties regarding this particular issue. While in Italy, the centre-right and the centre-left have different ways of dealing with immigration, in the UK, both the Labour party and the Conservative share the same vision of “managed migration” and the orientation towards a high-skilled foreign workforce. While the negative portrayals of Romanians promoted by the Italian media were overcome by political dialogue and bilateral agreements, the UK was not open for debate with the A2 countries regarding labour migration.
**Conclusion**

The aim of my thesis was to offer possible explanations for the contradictory transitional arrangements adopted by the United Kingdom and Italy following the two most recent EU Enlargement rounds. While in 2004 the UK opened its labour market for the new member states’ nationals, in 2007 it adopted a restrictive approach towards Romanian and Bulgarian workers. Italy, on the other hand, opened important sectors for the A2 nationals after restricting the access to its labour market in 2004.

The “chain migration” approach indicates that the strong linkages between Poland and the UK that developed after WW2 determined a significant inflow of people even before the 2004 EU accession. This can explain in part the massive migration that happened in the last three years. As the “migratory chain” framework presupposes, the migratory linkages between countries can go from strong to weak. The Polish migration to the UK can be characterized as “strong”, just as the Romanian migration to Italy. However, the fears promoted by the UK in relation to the Romanian work migration are not sustained by the “chain migration” model, or by the statistics. By looking at the tendencies, it was challenging to understand why Italy chose to be more open to Romanian workers in 2007, although the numbers show a great predilection of Romanians towards this particular country.

Italy and the UK have two different ways of managing migration and different priorities when it comes to foreign labour migration. One the one hand, Italy has promoted a need for a low or medium-skilled workforce. This is illustrated by the structure of the entry quotas and also by the decision-making system, which takes into consideration the needs of the social partners. Their most recent policies also show openness for the same type of foreign workers. On the other hand, the UK is a country with an older immigration tradition, especially from the Commonwealth countries but also from Eastern and Western Europe. Starting from 1961, the UK’s immigration
policies have shown a clear restrictive direction for the foreign workforce. The work permit system and the clear preference for highly skilled and skilled migrants are elements that confirm the restrictive attitude towards the low skilled work. The most recent Points Based System shows that the UK’s policies are not going to change any time soon.

The political and public discourse in the UK and Italy differs in several significant ways, which can explain their different approaches towards the transitional arrangements in 2007. Although the media promotes negative clichés of the new member states’ citizens in both countries, the major difference is that in Italy there is not so much interest in the economic impact of labour migrants, as in the UK. Another significant element is represented by the vision of the major political parties regarding this particular issue. While in Italy, the centre-right and the centre-left have different ways of dealing with immigration, in the UK, both the Labour party and the Conservatives share the same vision of “managed migration” and the orientation towards a high-skilled foreign workforce. While the negative portrayals of Romanians promoted by the Italian media were overcome by political dialogue and bilateral agreements, the UK was not open to debate with the A2 countries regarding labour migration.

Taking all these elements into consideration, it can be concluded that in 2004 neither of the two countries adopted the policies that were in line with their labour market goals. It was in 2007 that both Italy and the United Kingdom showed their preferences in a clear manner, one by lifting the work restrictions and the other one by imposing them.
Appendixes:

Appendix 1

National Responses after the 2007 Enlargement Round (transitional arrangements)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>decision to ...</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Open partially (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Open partially (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Restrict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(As at 24/1/2007)

Source: EU Commission Website

(1) Transitional measures for 1 year: no work permit required in certain sectors, eased conditions for issuing of work permit in the other sectors
(2) Work permit required, eased conditions for issuing of work permit in certain sectors
## Appendix 2

### 2.2.1A. UK: Acquisition of citizenship by country of former nationality (1980-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (total)</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (former)</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>495</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
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### 2.2.1B. UK: Acquisition of citizenship by country of former nationality (1990-2004)

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<td>180</td>
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<td>380</td>
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</table>

2.2.1C. UK: Stock of Foreign-born population by country of birth, 2001

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eastern European Countries</td>
<td>187,262</td>
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</table>

Source: Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics
Appendix 3

2.2.2A. Classification of the first developing countries for permits of stay

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1990</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>63.809</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>122.230</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>31.881</td>
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<td>57.312</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>22.335</td>
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<td>Ex Yugoslavia</td>
<td>54.800</td>
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<td>21.073</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>35.310</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>24.841</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>12.998</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>23.606</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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Source: ISTAT on data from Ministry of Interior

2.2.2B Stock of foreign labour in Italy by nationality (thousands) at 31st December 2005

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>% Increase 1995 - 2005</th>
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<td>17.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
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Source: OECD-Sopemi 2006

[1] ISTAT: [http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html](http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html).
### 2.2.2C. Stock of foreign labour in Italy by nationality (%) 31<sup>st</sup> December 2005

<table>
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<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
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</table>

Source: OECD-Sopemi 2006<sup>142</sup>

### 2.2.2D. Stock of Foreign Population in Italy (1990-2003): legal residents

<table>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>2670</td>
<td>3063</td>
<td>3256</td>
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<td>4832</td>
<td>5278</td>
<td>7378</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>8375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>4866</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>3429</td>
<td>3674</td>
<td>3669</td>
<td>4133</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>2846</td>
<td>3107</td>
<td>3298</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>2381</td>
<td>2846</td>
<td>3107</td>
<td>3298</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2278</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td>2506</td>
<td>2690</td>
<td>2815</td>
<td>3428</td>
<td>3318</td>
<td>3625</td>
<td>3690</td>
<td>3760</td>
<td>3316</td>
<td>4214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>16966</td>
<td>19098</td>
<td>12139</td>
<td>10490</td>
<td>11719</td>
<td>12400</td>
<td>13955</td>
<td>23163</td>
<td>22938</td>
<td>23258</td>
<td>29478</td>
<td>30419</td>
<td>32889</td>
<td>34980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>3314</td>
<td>5715</td>
<td>7111</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>7494</td>
<td>13548</td>
<td>8250</td>
<td>8419</td>
<td>9756</td>
<td>12026</td>
<td>14212</td>
<td>26894</td>
<td>28796</td>
<td>33777</td>
<td>61212</td>
<td>69999</td>
<td>82985</td>
<td>94818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>3716</td>
<td>3599</td>
<td>4230</td>
<td>4920</td>
<td>5480</td>
<td>5720</td>
<td>7271</td>
<td>8641</td>
<td>10135</td>
<td>13399</td>
<td>13272</td>
<td>13108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2489</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>2972</td>
<td>3403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3067</td>
<td>6527</td>
<td>9068</td>
<td>12618</td>
<td>14804</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica).<sup>142</sup>

---

2.2.2E. Preferred Destinations for Romanian Workers\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{graph.png}
\caption{Bar chart showing preferred destinations for Romanian workers.}
\end{figure}

Source: Open Society Foundation, December 2006.

\textsuperscript{144} OSF Study. \url{http://www.osf.ro/ro/detalii_program.php?id_prog=34}. (April 18, 2007)
Appendix 4

3.1A. Foreign residents in Italy holding a work permit 1985-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Residence permits (at 1 January)</th>
<th>Of which, non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>263731</td>
<td>133431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>289068</td>
<td>151714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>380425</td>
<td>227734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>422678</td>
<td>258464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>319291</td>
<td>226369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>550457</td>
<td>422489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>692630</td>
<td>571621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>648935</td>
<td>548531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>509457</td>
<td>485426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>649102</td>
<td>540993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>677791</td>
<td>563156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>729159</td>
<td>606974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>986020</td>
<td>857897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1022896</td>
<td>887689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1090820</td>
<td>948692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1340655</td>
<td>1194792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1379749</td>
<td>1233584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1448392</td>
<td>1308335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1503286</td>
<td>1352420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/12/2003</td>
<td>2193999</td>
<td>2040530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.2B. Number of Migrants Regularized in Italy 1986-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Applicants</th>
<th>Number Regularized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>118 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>235 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>256 000</td>
<td>238 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>308 000</td>
<td>193 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>700 000</td>
<td>634 700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM (2001)\(^{146}\)

\(^{145}\) Information offered by the International Organization for Migration.
3.2C. New Hires and Expected Demand of Immigrants, including Training Needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Sector</th>
<th>Foreign-born hires, 2003 (a)</th>
<th>Expected demand for immigrant labour, 2004 (b)</th>
<th>% of all hires, 2004 (b)</th>
<th>% requiring training (b)</th>
<th>% with no prior experience (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and Restaurants</td>
<td>70544</td>
<td>18059</td>
<td>33,5</td>
<td>53,3</td>
<td>54,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Industry</td>
<td>65065</td>
<td>35490</td>
<td>34,1</td>
<td>51,8</td>
<td>31,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Postal services</td>
<td>29426</td>
<td>14033</td>
<td>33,1</td>
<td>55,4</td>
<td>43,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Industry</td>
<td>24017</td>
<td>12632</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td>72,7</td>
<td>48,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>18855</td>
<td>14334</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>80,9</td>
<td>59,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>16381</td>
<td>5959</td>
<td>18,5</td>
<td>65,4</td>
<td>56,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Industry</td>
<td>14436</td>
<td>5341</td>
<td>28,8</td>
<td>76,7</td>
<td>57,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile Industry</td>
<td>13099</td>
<td>6235</td>
<td>28,3</td>
<td>68,1</td>
<td>46,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>8870</td>
<td>10948</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td>83,2</td>
<td>29,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Industry</td>
<td>8097</td>
<td>6751</td>
<td>24,1</td>
<td>78,4</td>
<td>42,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber Industry</td>
<td>5502</td>
<td>2746</td>
<td>36,3</td>
<td>85,3</td>
<td>73,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood / Furniture Industry</td>
<td>4962</td>
<td>5213</td>
<td>32,3</td>
<td>68,3</td>
<td>44,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Industry</td>
<td>4879</td>
<td>3885</td>
<td>26,6</td>
<td>82,6</td>
<td>57,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto repair</td>
<td>4669</td>
<td>4505</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>73,6</td>
<td>42,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Industry</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>1694</td>
<td>22,6</td>
<td>80,7</td>
<td>56,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking / Financial Services</td>
<td>2506</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>74,4</td>
<td>62,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>23,5</td>
<td>63,8</td>
<td>44,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity/Gas/Water Industry</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>11,5</td>
<td>72,1</td>
<td>51,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>130-422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>337-155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>771-113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Excelsior Unioncamere, Italian Ministry of Labor (Documento programmatico 2004-2006), Caritas (2004).\(^{147}\)

3.2D. Categories within the quota system 1998-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Preferential quotas(^1)</th>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Seasonal</th>
<th>Contract</th>
<th>Self Employed</th>
<th>Job-Seekers</th>
<th>Nurses</th>
<th>High Tech</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>54500</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>54500</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19000</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>39400</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>68500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(no limit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20400(^2)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>6100</td>
<td>2500(^a)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(no limit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22000(^2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>30000</td>
<td>2500(^a)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(no limit)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) includes descendents of Italians from South America (see table 5)

\(^2\) after 1/5/04, an additional 36,000 from the 10 new EU countries were added, and 70,500 for 2005

\(^a\) of which a maximum of 1751 can be conversion of study/training permits for current foreign residents

Source: Italian Ministry of Labour 2005\(^{148}\)

\(^{146}\) Emilio Reyneri. *Mass Legalization of Migrants in Italy: Permanent or Temporary Emergence from the Underground Economy?* South European Society and Politics, 1998.

## Appendix 5

### 3.2E. Net Immigration from the New Commonwealth to the UK 1953-1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>42,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>42,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>29,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>57,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>136,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>94,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3.2F. Work permits granted by industry in the UK 1995 and 2000-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration, business and management services</td>
<td>4,041 16.7</td>
<td>9,026 14.0</td>
<td>10,132 11.9</td>
<td>11,209 12.6</td>
<td>30,367 12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture activities</td>
<td>952   3.9</td>
<td>267   0.4</td>
<td>748   0.9</td>
<td>954   1.1</td>
<td>1,969 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer services</td>
<td>1,827 7.6</td>
<td>12,726 19.7</td>
<td>15,075 18.6</td>
<td>12,453 14.1</td>
<td>41,054 17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and land services</td>
<td>182   0.8</td>
<td>751   1.2</td>
<td>1,515  1.8</td>
<td>2,108  2.4</td>
<td>4,374 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and cultural activities</td>
<td>1,901  7.9</td>
<td>3,632  5.9</td>
<td>8,003  9.4</td>
<td>8,142  9.2</td>
<td>19,977 8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment and leisure services</td>
<td>2,919 12.1</td>
<td>4,235  6.6</td>
<td>4,725  5.5</td>
<td>4,471  5.0</td>
<td>13,431 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraction industries</td>
<td>424   1.8</td>
<td>1,044  1.6</td>
<td>1,223  1.4</td>
<td>1,024  1.2</td>
<td>3,291 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>3,194 13.2</td>
<td>6,997 10.8</td>
<td>7,026  8.3</td>
<td>5,019  5.7</td>
<td>19,042 8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>46    0.2</td>
<td>228   0.4</td>
<td>552   0.6</td>
<td>570   0.6</td>
<td>1,350 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and medical services</td>
<td>1,774  7.3</td>
<td>14,516 22.5</td>
<td>20,592 24.2</td>
<td>22,271 25.1</td>
<td>57,379 24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality, hotels, catering and other services</td>
<td>320   1.3</td>
<td>1,751  2.7</td>
<td>4,059  5.5</td>
<td>10,007 11.4</td>
<td>16,497 6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law related services</td>
<td>258   1.1</td>
<td>881   1.4</td>
<td>1,170  1.4</td>
<td>833   0.9</td>
<td>2,884 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,087  8.2</td>
<td>2,747  4.3</td>
<td>3,222  3.8</td>
<td>3,070  3.5</td>
<td>9,039 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate and property services</td>
<td>5     0.0</td>
<td>94    0.1</td>
<td>147   0.2</td>
<td>194   0.2</td>
<td>435 0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and wholesale services</td>
<td>2,826 11.7</td>
<td>927   1.4</td>
<td>874   1.0</td>
<td>1,285  1.4</td>
<td>3,066 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and protective services</td>
<td>2     0.0</td>
<td>58    0.1</td>
<td>84    0.1</td>
<td>78    0.1</td>
<td>220 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sporting activities</td>
<td>544   2.3</td>
<td>989   1.5</td>
<td>1,287  1.5</td>
<td>1,585  1.8</td>
<td>3,841 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>458   1.9</td>
<td>2,228  3.5</td>
<td>1,621  1.9</td>
<td>1,660  1.9</td>
<td>5,500 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>333   1.4</td>
<td>780   1.2</td>
<td>1,207  1.4</td>
<td>1,005  1.1</td>
<td>2,992 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities, gas, electricity, water</td>
<td>168   0.7</td>
<td>408   0.8</td>
<td>502   0.6</td>
<td>624   0.7</td>
<td>1,624 0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 24,161 100.0 | 64,575 100.0 | 85,144 100.0 | 88,622 100.0 | 238,341 100.0

Source: Overseas Labour Service, Work Permits UK

3.2G Migrant and not-migrant employment by industry sector March-May 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey and IPPR calculations
Appendix 6

4.2C. Frequency of Articles in the British media (August 15-November 1st, 2006)

Fig. 3.3.2 Net effect and average impact of key issues, as they appeared in the high and medium-circulation newspapers in the UK.

Source: CISION UK Ltd 2007
Reference List:


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